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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the strategic planning and
implementation process within the law enforcement missions of
the United States Coast Guard. The Coast Guard is a unique
federal agency for several reasons . Unlike many federal
agencies, it has numerous missions that are not closely
related. Coast Guard units are located throughout the United
States and the world. There are various other political and
organizational pressures that confront the Coast Guard
leadership. This thesis looks at the Coast Guard law
enforcement organization with an eye towards the changing
dynamics that must be dealt with in strategic planning,
including the various pressures that specifically affect the
Coast Guard's lav; enforcement mission.
Field interviews were conducted to identify themes and
problems that relate to law enforcement strategic planning for
lav; enforcement missions. Additionally, a survey was
developed based on theme constructs, which was used for
quantitative analysis and model development. Based on a
literature review, qualitative analysis, model review, and
quantitative analysis, we then detail conclusions and
recommendations that may improve strategic planning for the
law enforcement mission within the Coast Guard and can be
applied to many organizations that face multiple missions in
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The Operational Law Enforcement Division (G-OLE) at Coast
Guard Headquarters has been aware for some time that strategic
planning for the law enforcement missions has been limited in
its success. The Plans and Policy Branch (G-OLE-1) has
articulated its desire to improve strategic planning mainly in
terms of improving the communication of mission goals and the
assessment of mission execution. In this light, (G-OLE-1)
expressed the need for improving the Coast Guard's measures of
effectiveness for the law enforcement missions. This thesis
focuses on the various factors and constraints that are




The purpose of this thesis is to first identify the
factors and constraints that are related to strategic planning
for the Coast Guard law enforcement missions. We wish to
provide an analysis of interview and survey data that will
identify symptoms of various strategic planning problems.
Once these themes are identified we will recommend possible
courses of action the Coast Guard can take to improve the
strategic planning process for the law enforcement mission.
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Our research should give (G-OLE-1) an initial amount of data
and information whereby they will be able to draw additional
conclusions to bring about their own management actions.
Finally this thesis can be the impetus for future research on
this subject so that strategic planning will continually
improve in the law enforcement missions.
C. RESEARCH METHOD
A literature review was done to identify pertinent
research on strategic planning that had been done by various
authors. Semi-structured interviews were conducted of Coast
Guard personnel at various organizational levels and
geographic locations as per the following:
UNIT TYPE ATLANTIC AREA PACIFIC AREA TOTAL
AREA 4 4
DISTRICT 3 2 5
GROUP 3 2 5
STATION 5 3 8
AIRSTA 2 2 4
WHEC 13 4
WMEC 4 2 6
WPB 3 3 6
OTHER 3 3
TOTAL 24 21 4 5
The personnel interviewed were all assigned to Coast Guard
units that were involved in the law enforcement mission to
some degree. Constructs and themes were generated from the
interview data to do qualitative analysis and to develop a
survey
.
A survey was mailed to different Coast Guard units
throughout the organization as follows with results being
quantitatively analyzed:
UNIT TYPE ATLANTIC AREA PACIFIC AREA TOTAL
AREA 3 3 6
DISTRICT 9 9 18
GROUP 3 9 3 9 7 8
STATION 2 5 2 2 47
AIRSTA 11 10 j :
WHEC 11 11 22
WMEC 16 15 31
WPB 21 21 42
TOTAL 13 5 13 2 65
The literature review, qualitative analysis and
quantitative analysis were then integrated to develop
conclusions so that recommendations could then be made.
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The principal research question is how strategic planning
for the Coast Guard law enforcement mission can be improved.
The first subsidiary question addresses various constraints
and factors that are involved in the planning and execution of
the law enforcement missions. The other subsidiary question
is how to improve strategic communications for the Coast Guard
law enforcement mission.
E. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS
Chapter II of this thesis gives a historical perspective
of the Coast Guard as an organization. It also serves to
describe the various lav/ enforcement missions of the Coast
Guard
.
Chapter III is a literature review of relevant material
focusing on consensus building in strategic planning.
Chapter IV is a qualitative analysis of interview data
collected for this thesis.
Chapter V is a quantitative analysis of the survey data
collected for this thesis.
Chapter VI contains conclusions and recommendations based
on the analysis of the integrated data and the literature
review.
II. THE COAST GUARD - HISTORY AND LAW ENFORCEMENT
A. HISTORY
The history of the United States Coast Guard is a proud
one, with law enforcement missions taking center stage of
importance to the nation with respect to civil defense. Some
important dates are discussed below, which show the
development of the Coast Guard's major missions, with emphasis
on lav/ enforcement :
1789 - The Revenue Act of 1789 was passed, which enabled the
new nation to collect tariffs on goods shipped into
the country, to help offset the large debt from the
Revolutionary War.
1790 - Congress authorized the establishment and support of
ten cutters for the purpose of enforcing custom laws.
This was the first mention of legal authority for the
new service, then called the Revenue Service.
1793 - The Coasting and Fishing Act of 1793 was passed,
which limited coastal fishing off the United States
to U.S. vessels. This law lacked enforcement though,
as Revenue Service vessels were only able to stop
violators and escort them to waters outside a three
mile limit
.
1799 - Congress authorized Revenue Service Cutters to fire
at vessels that refused to 'heave to' when ordered to
do so. Also in this year, the Revenue Service saw
its first military action, when it became involved in
the undeclared war with France.
1831 - The Revenue Service became involved in the life
saving area of operations.
1837 - Congress directed the Revenue Service to aid mariners
in distress during its law enforcement patrols.
1890 - A Revenue Service Cutter seized a vessel for
transporting opium. This was the first drug related
seizure; before this time, drugs were of more
interest to the Coast Guard as a taxable item.
1906 - The Alien Fishing Act was enacted, which prohibited
foreign vessels from fishing commercially in Alaskan
waters
.
1911 - The Fur Seal Convention of 1911, and the Fur Seal Act
of 1912, limited the catching of such animals as the
sea otter and other fur bearing sea creatures, which
lived in and around Alaskan waters.
1915 - The Revenue Service was merged with the Life Saving
Service, creating the U.S. Coast Guard. The Life
Saving Service had consisted of beach patrols to aid
swimmers and warn vessels sailing into danger.
1920 - The Volstead Act brought about prohibition. The
Coast Guard was directed to ensure that no liquor was
smuggled into the nation via waterways. This turned
out to be very difficult for the Coast Guard to
enforce, as was evident from the great number of
successful smuggling stories.
1933 - Prohibition ended.
1939 - The Coast Guard acquired responsibility for aids to
navigation, when the Lighthouse Service was
transferred from the Commerce Department to the
Treasury Department
.
1942 - The Bureau of Marine Inspection and Navigation
shifted from the Commerce Department to the Treasury
Department
. These duties were absorbed by the Coast
Guard, and included supervising ship construction and
the licensing of vessel operators.
1950 - The Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Act passed, and was
the first law concerned with conservation of fish,
although it applied only to U.S. vessels until 1971.
1964 - The Bartlett Act prescribed civil and criminal
penalties for foreign vessels fishing within three
miles of any U.S. coast. This three mile limit was
known as the contiguous fishing zone, and was later
expanded to nine and then twelve miles.
1967 - The Coast Guard became part of the Department of
Transportation
.
1976 - The Fishery Conservation and Management Act (FMCA)
was enacted, expanding United States control over
fishing areas extending two hundred miles from the
coast. This was a very complicated and misunderstood
law, which did not prohibit foreign fishing in this
area, but limited the types and amounts of fish which
could be caught, and established certain standard
criteria for fishing, such as net size, and other
miscellaneous criteria.
1980 - The Coast Guard started to get involved regularly in
Alien Migration Interdiction Operations (AMIO)
.
B. LAW ENFORCEMENT OVERVIEW
The above historical chronology shows how Coast Guard
missions have evolved into four major program areas: Maritime
Law Enforcement, Marine Safety, Environmental Protection and
National Security. While the Coast Guard budget has grown
from $1.69 billion in 1984 to $2.24 billion in 1990, Maritime
Law Enforcement funding has grown from 27.3% to 34.7% of the
budget during this same time period; while other missions have
each decreased slightly as a percentage of the budget over
this same time period. The Coast Guard's Maritime Law
Enforcement activities fall into two main categories: general
law enforcement and enforcement of conservation regulations.
The general law enforcement program involves marine
interdiction of controlled substances, enforcement of
immigration laws, recreational boating regulations and other
criminal activities such as vessel hijackings. Enforcement of
conservation regulations concerns protection of fisheries and
marine living resources.
C. LAW ENFORCEMENT MISSIONS AND METHODS
1. Maritime Drug Interdiction
During the 1970s, the primary drug being smuggled into
the U.S. was marijuana, with the primary source being Mexico,
via over land routes. Expanded enforcement activities by both
the U.S. and Mexico shifted the primary source of drugs to
Colombia. By the early 1980s, many smugglers had started to
bring bulk contraband to the U.S. by sea routes. Smuggling
drugs by sea into the U.S. involves Coast Guard jurisdiction,
and as a result, the Coast Guard expanded its general law
enforcement activities to halt the new inflow of illegal drugs
by sea. From 1973 - 1980, the number of tons of marijuana
seized by the Coast Guard, increased from 8 to 1247
.
Congressional action during the early 1980s
strengthened the Coast Guard's maritime drug interdiction
efforts. Congress passed laws that amended the elements of
proof necessary to prosecute trafficking cases, and expanded
the jurisdiction over those cases associated with smugglers.
Congress also passed laws allowing the Department of Defense
(DOD) to assist in general law enforcement efforts.
Coast Guard drug seizures occur as a result of one of
three operations. The first type of seizure occurs while
executing another mission. For example, drug smugglers may
request assistance during an emergency condition, and when the
Coast Guard arrives on the scene, the drugs are discovered and
seized. The second type of seizure occurs from information
gained by investigative work. The Coast Guard receives such
information from other law enforcement agencies or private
citizens. During this type of seizure, before the vessel
enters U.S. waters, the Coast Guard possesses all knowledge
necessary to intercept and seize the drug carrying vessel. The
third type of seizure results from Coast Guard planes' and
ships' patrol efforts. The planes and ships search for
smugglers, and then identify, board and inspect the most
suspicious vessels. Patrol efforts like this, produce the
most seizures .
The East Coast maritime drug interdiction efforts
produce significantly more seizures than the West Coast drug
interdiction efforts. The East Coast maritime smuggler routes
pass through identified choke points. Coast Guard ships and
planes concentrate on those particular choke points, thus
attaining high interdiction rates. No particular choke points
exist on the U.S. West Coast due to the nature of land masses
in the Pacific Ocean. Consequently, fewer drug interdiction
seizures occur on the West Coast. Although no choke points
exist on the West Coast, the Coast Guard does expend much
effort to identify suspicious activity. Numerous aircraft
perform surveillance flights, and ships patrol the sea lanes,
documenting all vessel sightings. These efforts produce
approximately 22,000 West Coast vessel sightings per year.
The Coast Guard uses a main frame computer to store
and categorize both West and East Coast sightings. Sightings
gathered from patrols may contain a vessel with a history of
drug smuggling. The computer will run a check of vessel names
for known drug involvement history. If the vessel possesses
a drug involvement history, the Coast Guard uses covert
surveillance to uncover any illegal activity.
2. Fishery Conservation
Concern over exploitation of fish stocks off U.S.
Coasts prompted enactment of the Magnuson Fishery Conservation
and Management Act of 1976. Enforcement of this act requires
the Coast Guard to patrol fisheries within a 200 mile
conservation zone of the U.S. coast. The law allows Coast
Guard patrol vessels to board any fishing vessel to ensure
compliance with the 1976 Magnuson law.
The U.S. Coast Guard monitors all fishing vessels
within the 200 mile U.S. coastal fishing zone. All foreign
fishing vessels undergo periodic inspections by the Coast
Guard. U.S. domestic vessels receive inspections by local
state authorities in port. Historically, there has been a
higher rate of violations by foreign fishing vessels, and
consequently, the Coast Guard concentrates their efforts in
monitoring the foreign fishing fleet.
National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) places U.S.
observers on 20% of the foreign fishing fleet, while Congress
desires 100% coverage. The objective of 100% coverage is that
foreign fishermen will hesitate to mis-report or under report
their catch with an agent onboard. The Alaskan fishing waters
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involve 92% of all foreign fishing conducted in the United
States. Operational units based in Kodiak, Alaska, maintain
surveillance on the foreign fishing fleet in Alaskan waters.
Surveillance of the foreign fishing fleet relies primarily on
reports or sightings by U.S. Coast Guard planes and ships.
Daily flights by Coast Guard C130s report the positions of the
foreign fishing vessels. Coast Guard ships patrolling the
area note the positions and conduct periodic boardings.
Seasonal high concentrations involve as many as 300
foreign fishing vessels in Alaskan waters. Personnel at the
U.S. Coast Guard Air Station Kodiak, manually plot the
positions of each foreign fishing vessel on a wall map,
producing an effective graphical tool, even though the
plotting consumes a lot of time and effort.
3 . Immigration
The Coast Guard's involvement in controlling illegal
alien activity by sea, shows historic involvement dating back
to slave trade during the 1810s, but until April 1980, the
Coast Guard had only minor involvement in stemming illegal
immigration. Between April and September 1980, a massive
illegal Cuban immigration to the U.S. by sea occurred.
Approximately 125,000 Cuban aliens departed Cuba for the U.S.
The Coast Guard provided search and rescue support to the
poorly outfitted immigrants. During the Cuban immigration,
the Coast Guard received direction to forcefully prevent U.S.
ships from going to Cuba to bring back illegal aliens.
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Current trends indicate increased law enforcement efforts in
stemming the flow of illegal aliens. From 1981 - 1991, the
total number of illegal aliens handled by the Coast Guard,
grew from approximately 200 to over 13,000.
Due to the evolving growth of illegal aliens coming to
the U.S. by sea, methods of law enforcement are also evolving
and being handled as individual events occur.
4 . Other Law Enforcement Activities
Activities that concern the U.S. Coast Guard, but
occur on an infrequent basis, include investigating vessel
hijackings, reducing fishing gear losses, and preventing
illegal civil craft loitering. The Coast Guard investigates
and prosecutes all known or suspected vessel thefts or
hijackings occurring in federal jurisdictions. The Coast
Guard's operational commitments include record keeping,
intelligence gathering, information dissemination, and
surveillance
.
The Coast Guard goal is to prevent or minimize damage
to marine fishing gear. Most damage occurs as a result of
interference between fixed and mobile gear users. The duties
of the Coast Guard involve plotting the position of the
fishing gear and disseminating this information through marine
broadcasts
.
Various maritime danger areas pose threats to civil
craft. Danger areas include those DOD designated weapons
testing zones. The Coast Guard's function includes informing
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vessel operators of the status of various danger areas. The
Coast Guard handles other law enforcement activities as the
individual events occur.
D. LAW ENFORCEMENT GOALS
1. Maritime Drug Interdiction
The Coast Guard's largest efforts in the smuggling
domain involve narcotics trafficking into the United States.
Although concern exists over the smuggling of other goods in
and out of the U.S., the main thrust has been narcotics. The
Coast Guard's long term goal with respect to drugs is:
- Detect or deter 75% of the violations of federal laws and
international agreements relating to illicit trafficking
in narcotics and psychotropic substances.
- Cooperate with other agencies engaged in maritime law
enforcement in those areas for which the Coast Guard
shares statutory responsibility or has enforcement
authority
.
It has been estimated that the Coast Guard is
successful in preventing from 5% to 15% of the amount of
marijuana illegally entering the U.S. through waterways. Even
smaller percentages are estimated for other smuggled goods.
The 75% goal appears very optimistic in light of these
statistics
.
Some Coast Guard law enforcement personnel feel that
a more realistic and less quantitative goal may be to increase
effectiveness of efforts without increasing operational
resources. In other words, instead of basing the goal on a
percentage of an unknown number, the goal should be to
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increase the number of violators caught. Another major
problem the Coast Guard is now in the process of resolving is
the historical lack of integration with other agencies
involved in counter-narcotics law enforcement, such as U.S.
Customs, the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) , and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
2 . Fisheries
The Coast Guard long term goals for fisheries are as
follows
:
- Detect or deter 95% of the foreign violations of laws and
treaties involving fisheries.
- Detect or deter domestic violations of laws and treaties
involving fisheries.
- Provide support for other agencies which share
statutory responsibilities with the Coast Guard regarding
fishery law enforcement.
The overriding law (the FMCA) is relatively new and is
not completely understood by all the foreign fishermen working
in U.S. controlled waters. This law, in conjunction with
other fishing regulations, is very complicated and detailed.
Also, the fact that this mission must integrate the efforts of
the Coast Guard and National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS),
and with the ocean coverage area being so immense, make this
95% goal very ambitious.
3. Alien Immigration and Other Goals
The Coast Guard goal for alien immigration and other
law enforcement missions, is stated in very general terms, as
follows
14
- Detect or deter an optimum level of violations of federal
laws and treaties other than those related to drugs,
fisheries, non-living resources, or those pertaining to
other Coast Guard programs
.
Due to the increasing prominence of alien migration cases
into the U.S., and the fact that this mission must be
integrated with the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS), and the National Security Council (NSC), the "optimum"
cited as a goal has been very hard to define and achieve.
Also, due to the multi-dimensional nature of other law
enforcement missions, "optimum" again has been hard to define
and achieve.
E. CURRENT LAW ENFORCEMENT TRENDS
Late in 1991, the Coast Guard conducted a huge lav;
enforcement and search and rescue operation in response to the
seaborne migration of thousands of Haitians. This pace has
been kept steady through 1993. During this same time period,
the Coast Guard increased its fisheries enforcement
activities, and continued high tempo operations at sea. The
Fiscal Year 1991 Coast Guard budget was $3.41 billion. When
the percentages of operating expenses in FY 1986 are compared
to those of FY 1991, there is a subtle, yet significant shift
in the funding emphasis among major Coast Guard programs.
Since 1986, the share of the budget devoted to search and
rescue and aids to navigation had declined, marine safety and
marine environmental protection programs had shown modest
growth, while the most significant growth was in marine law
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enforcement, making clear the continuing emphasis that the
Coast Guard places on the law enforcement mission. This trend
has continued into 1993.
F. RESOURCES NEEDED FOR COAST GUARD LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT OF THE LAW ENFORCEMENT MISSIONS
An Operating Program Plan for any given fiscal year
describes the required resources needed for the Coast Guard's
law enforcement mission, and notes that the Coast Guard
possesses insufficient resources to meet all of its law
enforcement objectives. Even though funding has grown in this
area, the above discussion was designed to show just how much
the law enforcement missions have grown historically. The
discussion also showed, not only that the law enforcement
missions are many, but that they are often complicated
missions, and involve much integration with other federal law
enforcement agencies. With these complications in mind, is
there a way to optimize Coast Guard law enforcement
effectiveness, subject to limited resource constraints?
In this thesis, we will identify and analyze the Coast
Guard law enforcement policy formulation process, and the
strategic planning and implementation processes within the
Coast Guard law enforcement community. We will then look at
law enforcement execution at the operational level to
determine if the policy- strategy-execution process of Coast
Guard law enforcement is optimizing effectiveness subject to
limited resources; if not, why not, and how can this process
16
be improved upon? In the next chapter, we look at a strategic
planning models and thinking that is somewhat new to
management literature.
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III. STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT LITERATURE REVIEW
A. INTRODUCTION
The ultimate goal of this thesis is to identify methods
and means by which the Coast Guard can improve the strategic
planning process in its law enforcement mission. Literature
will be reviewed in this chapter to assist in this task.
Strategy formulation has traditionally been considered a task
for upper-level management to perform, the notion being that
managers think and workers perform tasks . Recent research
indicates that effective strategy development and
implementation requires a departure from this traditional
concept. Indeed the gulf between strategies conceived by top
management and awareness at lower levels has been called the
"implementation gap", and evidence suggests that it is
widening. For example, a Booz-Allen survey of Fortune 500 top
executives reports that only a quarter of them believe
strategy implementation is consistent with strategy
development in their own companies. Unsuccessful execution of
strategy is caused by middle and operating level managers who
are either ill-informed or unsupportive of the chosen
direction. Successful execution, on the other hand, means
managers acting on a common understanding and common
commitment. We call this combination of collective heart and
mind "strategic consensus".
B. CONSENSUS DISCUSSION
Consensus is a critical factor for improved strategy
development and implementation. Shaping consensus is an
effective approach to forming strategy. The important thing
is for top and middle-level managers to recognize problems
with consensus as causes of the implementation gap. For most,
this will be a new way of thinking about strategy. Consensus
building has been an important issue in management research
for a long time. Writings concerned with participative
management and other approaches to creating agreement have
received renewed interest in light of the special attention
which has been paid to Japanese management techniques in which
consensus building appears to play an essential part
.
Nielson developed an approach which, under a given set of
conditions, may be used to facilitate consensus decision
making. He recommended its use to (a) diminish fears of
contributors to a strategic plan lest special interest goals
or needs not be satisfied; (b) obtain support when power
cannot be used; (c) facilitate swift implementation; (d) meet
requirements established by internal governance policies or
external legal agencies. (Nielson, 1981)
In his article Dess cites 12 various research efforts that
examine organizational consensus from different perspectives.
(Dess, 1987) The research by Floyd and Wooldridge provides us
with the definition of strategic consensus that best fits our
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aims. They define strategic consensus as agreement among top,
middle- and operating-level managers on the fundamental
priorities of the organization. This agreement shows itself
in the actual decisions taken by managers, and its strength
can be assessed along both cognitive and emotional dimensions.
On the cognitive side, lack of consensus is created by
managers who don't share a common perception of what the
strategy means and who, therefore, pull in different
directions. Shared understanding should be probed at a deep
and specific level to determine whether managerial thinking is
truly "in sync". On the other side of consensus, unless
managers feel some degree of commitment to a strategy, their
actions are half-hearted, even when they're fully informed.
In general, strategic commitment depends on: (1) how the
contemplated strategy fits with what managers perceive as the
interest of the organization and (2) how it fits with the
managers' own, personal self-interests. (Floyd and Wooldridge,
1992)
C. STRATEGIC UNDERSTANDING AND COMMITMENT
The "understanding" part of consensus is described by
Floyd as the cognitive half of consensus. (Floyd and
Wooldridge, 1992) Reid gives his slant on this topic by
bringing out the notion of strategic thinking. The exercise
of strategic planning must not be merely an exercise in report
generation but must also include a measure of strategic
20
thinking. The idea is to have members of an organization
constantly view day-to-day operations and decisions through a
strategic "lens". Rather than seeing strategic planning as a
separate or non-routine function, it can be a part of an
organization's culture. (Reid, 1989)
The emotional dimension of consensus is called commitment
by Floyd. (Floyd and Wooldridge, 1992) Reid stresses the
importance of top level management first showing their
commitment to strategic planning. Strategy can be formulated
either with or without written documents, but it is unlikely
that genuine commitment could be won for any plan which is not
committed to paper. (Reid, 1989) This is especially true in
complex organizations where decision-making is often
collective. We recall experiences in our organizations when
upper level management merely paid lip service to long term
planning
.
Furthermore, if management is to overcome this problem of
obtaining a consensus they must begin by spending sufficient
time on the issue of creating it, yet time commitments for
this kind of "abstract" issue are very difficult to win. For
this reason some structure is required. . .it was the experience
of management in those companies which were using the "group
commitment" approach, that once having invested the initial
"difficult" time in developing and communicating the mission
statement, specific functional strategies were much easier to
develop and to gain agreement upon.
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The idea of commitment should not be passed over lightly
s an optional goal of top management. Middle managers with
low or negative commitment to the strategies formulated by
senior management create significant obstacles to effective
implementation. Middle managers are motivated more by their
perceived self-interest than by the organizational interest
unless they coincide; so the possibility of divergence between
the self-interest of middle managers, and organization
interest (as perceived by senior management), makes the
management of those processes that create middle management
commitment a necessary prerequisite for effective strategy
implementation
.
D. ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS OF CONSENSUS
Thus far we have tried to define strategic consensus for
the purposes of this thesis as being made of two components -
understanding and commitment . The environment that an
organization operates in is a factor to consider when studying
strategic consensus. When environmental munificence is low,
the opportunity to build organizational slack also is low and
the need for consensus on organizational objectives and
competitive methods increases. There has been a great deal of
conceptual confusion about organizational slack, and little
effort has been directed toward operationalizing the concept.
This perspective provides a suitable definition:
Organizational slack is that cushion of actual or
potential resources which allows an organization to adapt
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successfully to internal pressures for adjustment, or to
external pressures for changes in policy, as well as to
initiate changes in strategy with respect to the external
environment
.
When slack is low, the firm is concerned with conserving
resources. Consequently, strategic choices are constrained
and the organization is less able to pursue divergent ends and
means for achieving those ends. We believe it will be
important to explore the environmental ramifications for the
Coast Guard as an organization, particularly in light of its
multi-mission responsibilities that can change fairly rapidly
with the political winds.
E. LEVELS OF CONSENSUS
After looking at environmental aspects of consensus, we
will now look at levels of consensus. Understanding the
various levels of consensus is important to management because
it becomes a perspective that management can use in developing
and implementing strategy. Floyd provides us with a useful
way to frame this discussion about levels of consensus.
Combining the cognitive and emotional dimensions of
consensus as in Figure 3-1 results in four general
possibilities. When managers have both a common understanding
and a common commitment to strategy, strong consensus exists.
If managers are highly committed to "something" but do not
share an understanding about what that "something" is, they
are well-intentioned but ill-informed. We call this level of
consensus blind devotion. If managers share an understanding
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of strategy but are not committed to it, they are well
informed about the strategy but are not committed to it; they
are well informed but unwilling to act. We call this
condition informed skepticism. Finally, when neither shared
understanding nor commitment is high, weak consensus exists.






Strong Consensus Blind Devotion
Informed Skepticism Weak Consensus
Figure 3-1 Combining the Cognitive and Emotional Dimensions of Consensus.
All four levels of consensus can be appropriate or
inappropriate, depending on the situation. Strong consensus
is good when the chosen strategy works and the business
environment is relatively stable. But, what if something in
the competitive arena shifts? Continued allegiance to a well
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understood course of action can inhibit organizational
responsiveness by preventing managers from seeing the need for
change
.
F. CONSENSUS CONTENT AND SCOPE
Consensus content and scope are the final aspects of
strategic consensus that are important to this general
discussion. First, the content of consensus describes what
managers agree about, and this includes environmental
conditions, organizational goals and strategic methods.
Agreement on one doesn't necessarily imply agreement on
another. Consensus on overall goals, for example, doesn't
guarantee agreement about a specific course of action, and in
other cases, managers reach consensus about what to do without
agreeing on an overall goal
.
Second, the scope of consensus distinguishes who the
consensus is among. For strategy, the tendency is to think
exclusively in terms of top management, but this presumes they
fully comprehend the situation and know what needs to be done.
In complex or changing environments, individuals rarely
appreciate all the intricacies of the situation, and
organizations benefit from the variety of viewpoints
represented by middle and operating-level managers. Unless
they understand the strategic context, however, lower-level
managers are unable to recognize significant events, offer
sound advice, or propose good options.
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G. CONSENSUS OVERVIEW
So far we have tried to show that consensus is a critical
factor in both the development and implementation of strategy.
If consensus exists then strategy can be developed more
effectively because input from those closest to the actual
operations of the organization can be infused. Strategy
implementation becomes more likely to succeed when there is
consensus. Clearly when members of an organization take part
in developing a strategy, understand the strategy, and are
committed to it, the implementation of strategy can become a
reality
.
We have also described the effect the environment has on
organizational strategic consensus. Out of diverse
environments and situations can come different levels of
consensus. In addition, consensus content and scope help
characterize its role in strategy. Figure 3-2 is a skeleton
outline to bring together the themes discussed thus far
concerning consensus. (Floyd and Wooldridge, 1992)
H. MIDDLE MANAGEMENT'S ROLE IN CONSENSUS
Hopefully at this point the broad definitions of themes
pertaining to consensus are clear. We next will review the
literature on the subject of middle management involvement in
strategy. We will want to define who we consider middle
managers to be, and explain the importance of middle
management's role in strategy development and implementation.
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Strategic Consensus
Strategic Understanding Strategic Commitment
Levels of Consensus
Consensus Content Consensus Scope
Environment
Figure 3-2 Consensus Themes
One basis for defining who middle managers are is that of
the "linking pin". Here, a superior in one group is a
subordinate in the next, and so on, throughout the
organization. As participants in multiple, vertically related
groups, "linking pins" coordinate top and operating-level
activities. Conceptually therefore, middle management can be
defined as the coordination of an organizational unit's day-
to-day activities with the activities of vertically related
groups. As "linking pins", middle managers take actions that
have both upward and downward influences on strategy
formation. Upward influence affects top management's view of
organizational circumstances and/or the alternative strategies
under consideration. Middle management's downward influence,
on the other hand, affects the alignment of organizational
arrangements within the strategic context.
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With this general definition of who middle managers are,
we can move forward and discuss how important their influence
is in an organization. Middle management occupies a key
position; it is equipped with the ability to combine strategic
macro (context-free) information and hands-on micro (context-
specific) information. In other words, middle-management is
in a position to forge the organizational link between
deductive and inductive management. Middle management is able
to most effectively eliminate the noise, fluctuation, and
chaos within an organization's information creation structure
by serving as the starting point for action to be taken by
upper and lower levels. Therefore, middle managers are also
able to serve as the agent for change in the organization's
self-renewal process.
Other literature places additional importance on the role
of middle management. Floyd's other research on the role of
middle management in strategic planning takes on three related
implications. First, the involvement of middle managers
should be substantive rather than nominal. That is, the
purpose of increasing strategic involvement should be to
improve the quality of decisions, not to facilitate
implementation. Second, top management should clearly define
the strategic context. Interviews performed in various
organizations revealed that middle managers expected top
management direction, but often felt that they were in a
better position to initiate and assess alternative courses of
28
action. Finally, top management should expect middle-level
managers to question strategic decisions. The results show no
relationship between middle management consensus on strategy
and organizational performance. Apparently, substantive
involvement can be achieved best in organizational contexts
where individuals are comfortable critically examining
strategic decisions. (Floyd and Wooldridge, 1990)
Floyd elaborates in more detail on the role of middle
management in a different article. On the one hand, strategy
is a change process and requires divergent ideas that, if
acted upon, alter the organization's concept of strategy. On
the other hand, strategy is an "integrated pattern" and
requires ideas that coordinate dissimilar activities and
support a coherent direction. Although few ideas are purely
divergent or integrative, recognizing these two as poles of a
continuum, provides an appealing basis for classifying middle
management's cognitive contributions. As shown in Figure 3-3,
combining action and cognition along these lines results in
four types of middle management strategic involvement.
Championing alternatives and synthesizing information
represent upward forms of involvement, while facilitating
adaptability and implementing deliberate strategy are downward
terms. (Floyd and Wooldridge, 1992)
The preceding discussion about middle management's
strategic role was primarily focused on strategy development
.

















Figure 3-3 Middle Management Involvement in Strategy
management can look to middle management as a resource for
information that can provide an insertion of reality into
strategy. Top management creates a vision or dream and middle
management creates and implements concrete concepts to solve
and transcend the contradictions arising from gaps between
what exists at the moment and what management hopes to create.
In other words, top management creates an overall theory and
tests it empirically within the framework of the entire
organization
.
We want to continue to move towards the ultimate goal of
improving the strategic planning process for Coast Guard law
enforcement. In so doing, it has been made clear by various
researchers that middle management can be a first string
player in strategy development. Figure 3-4 gives a brief
summary outline of middle management's strategic involvement.
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Middle Management Strategic Involvement
Linking Pin for Information Creation
Upward & Downward Influence
Behavioral & Cognitive Influence
Figure 3-4
I. STRATEGIC PLANNING DISCUSSION
An emerging body of research indicates the need to stop
considering strategic planning as an infrequent exercise. A
major complication is that those involved in strategic
planning customarily belong to one of two groups - the
professional planner and the line manager. The solution
requires that planning should be a function in which line
managers engage; it should be part of a holistic management
approach. However, the reality is that strategic planning is
frequently a sterile process, one which is oriented merely to
the production of documents, the existence of which frequently
fails to result in any meaningful change in the behavior of
organizations
.
Floyd also recognized that strategic planning usually
takes the form of disjointed exercises. Research suggests
that high levels of shared understanding are built from direct
exposure to strategic priorities. (Floyd and Wooldridge, 1992)
This means establishing a conversation about strategy across
management levels and functions. As managers make proposals,
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offer alternatives, or question judgements, they become more
aware of one another's priorities, and the level of shared
understanding deepens. In the process, top management's
original intentions evolve to accommodate the inputs of middle
and operating levels. Strategy making is a dynamic,
continuous phenomena, and to understand it, managers at many
levels must be engaged first-hand in the thought process.
We now look to what the literature can show us about how
to change strategic planning from something done only in
emergencies to a continuous process. Since planning, in
particular strategic planning, is often a sterile process of
nothing more than a veneer overlaid across day-to-day
operations, the question remains as to how new life can be
injected? The results of this study suggest that to make the
planning process live and seem relevant to all it is necessary
to:
1. achieve permeation of planning effort;
2. make planning a continuous process;
3. stimulate strategic thinking.
Figures 3-5, 3-6 and 3-7 below outline the ways to
operationalize strategic planning as proposed by Reid. (Reid,
1989)
In concluding his research Reid offers some poignant
thoughts. The benefits of strategic planning are often
nullified, unless the process can be totally integrated with
the organizational way of life. Continuity and inseparability
32
Achieving Permeation
> Stimulate continuous participation in the planning process of all those
who are capable of contributing..
> Use the team briefing approach.
> Translate strategic analysis into meaningful terms among peers.
Figure 3-5
Making Planning A Continuous Process
> Establish operating philosophies
- Devote time and intellectual resources to formulating the mission
- Understand the environement and identify new arenas of opportunity
- Establish qualitative goals in the light of the competitive situation
> Seek to position the business to take advantage of opportunities
> Commit to achieve strategic objectives
- Translate aspirational goals into objectives which enable measurement
> Review and Control
- Accord planning a higher importance ranking
^
Figure 3-6
with the execution process are critical factors. (Reid, 1989)
This study has identified that only in a few cases is
strategic planning a live process within organizations. In
fact many organizations frequently fail to extract as much
benefit from the process as they could. Much more
intellectual effort could be generated by the key people in
organizations, and much more effective use could be made of
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Stimulating; Strategic Thinking
> Strategic planning process should lead to strategic thinking
> Highlight the importance of strategic thinking
- Make adjustments to the organizational climate
- Introduce objectives for producing actionable ideas
> Rewarding strategic thinking and removing the fear of penalization
Figure 3-7
the data at hand. By demonstrating a genuine commitment to
the principles of strategic planning, and stimulating thinking
across a wider boundary, better organizational positionings
would result, which would offer a long-term benefit. To make
this improvement is extremely difficult. Frequently the
commitment and energy does not exist in organizations. In
fact it requires a great deal of commitment . Concerted
efforts must be made to prime and fine-tune the organization
to harness the energies of those capable of contribution.
Since managers are often suspicious of the fickleness and
genuineness of those above them, senior management must be
patient. Commitment must be demonstrated consistently if the
change is to be pervasive and effective.
Figure 3-8 serves as a useful tool to bring together some
significant points about consensus. (Floyd and Wooldridge,
1992) With these ideas in mind, the next chapter will provide
a qualitative analysis of these three areas: a) Coast Guard
organizational issues, b) law enforcement strategic planning,
and c) field interview data.
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Shaping Consensus
> Managing the process by recognizing problems with consensus as causes of poor
strategy implementation.
> Examine the strategic context - determine appropriate level & form of consensus
> .Assess consensus by gathering data and producing consensus maps
> Identify the gaps in the strategy implemenatation
> Work to close the gap
- Improving understanding by increasing the quality of strategic conversations
- Enhancing commitment by realigning rewards, systems and structures
********************
If daily priorities are not consistent with strategy, then in what sense has the strategy been
implemented? If the people don't know or care about the strategic priorities.





The Coast Guard faces various organizational constraints
and pressures. The following list offers a framework for
readers to grasp some the challenges that are inherent in






A discussion of the above listed topics will come first.
Then an analysis of the interview data will follow to reveal
the real life perceptions of Coast Guard members at all levels
of the organization.
B. THE COAST GUARD'S MULTI -MISSION RESPONSIBILITY OVERVIEW
The history of the U.S. Coast Guard is as diverse as it is
long, spanning more than 200 years. In Chapter II a more
expanded history of the Coast Guard was given. At this point
a quick recap of how the Coast Guard came into being is
significant, because unlike many federal organizations, the
Coast Guard did not begin at any one time, for any single
purpose. Today's Coast Guard is a collection of other federal
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organizations that no longer exist. The Revenue Cutter
Service, forbearer of the Coast Guard, was established
originally in the Department of Treasury. Congress authorized
the building of the first fleet of 10 cutters. The Service
was renamed the Coast Guard in January 1915 when it merged
with the Lifesaving Service, which began in 1878. The
Lighthouse Service, originally established in 1789, joined the
Coast Guard in 1939. Later, the Bureau of Navigation and
Steamboat Inspection was permanently transferred to the Coast
Guard in 1946. After 177 years in the Treasury Department,
the Coast Guard transferred to the newly formed Department of
Transportation on April 1, 1967.
C. COAST GUARD MISSIONS
It is interesting to point out that the very creation of
the Coast Guard arose from collecting missions from other
agencies. This kind of legacy continues into current times.
The Coast Guard, consisting of over 39,000 active duty
members, the majority of whom are involved to some degree in
law enforcement, remains proud of its unique history and the
various roles it plays in providing for our national security.
Today's missions are as diverse as ever. The listing of
missions below helps paint a picture of an organization that
has very broad and vital responsibilities:
Aids to Navigation - Promotes safe and efficient passage
of marine and air traffic by providing continuous and
accurate, all-weather radio-navigation service . Maintains
short and long-range aids to navigation such as
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lighthouses and buoys. Operates long-range radio-
navigation transmitters including Loran and Omega.
Boating Safety - Reduces the risk of loss of life, personal
injury and property damage in recreational boating.
Defense Operations - As the hard core about which the Navy
forms in time of war, the Coast Guard provides operating
units with the combat capability necessary to function
effectively as an armed, naval force. In peacetime,
Maritime Defense Zone commanders are responsible for coastal
defense planning and exercises. In wartime, they conduct
port security and U.S. coastal defense operations within 200
miles offshore.
Environmental Response - Minimizes damage from pollutants
released in the coastal zone. Reduces threat to the marine
environment from potential spills of oil or hazardous
substances. Helps develop national and international
pollution response plans.
Ice Operations - Promotes maritime transportation in ice-
laden polar and domestic waters by providing icebreaking
capability for federal and scientific organizations. Keeps
domestic shipping routes and ports open year-round to meet
the reasonable demands of commerce.
Maritime Law Enforcement - Enforces all federal laws on,
under and over the high seas and waters under U.S.
jurisdiction. Interdicts drug smugglers and illegal
migrants. Enforces fisheries regulations and the Exclusive
Economic Zone out to 200 miles at sea, the U.S. continental
shelf, and any other U.S. territory or possession.
Marine Inspection - Minimizes deaths, injuries, property
loss and environmental damage by developing and enforcing
standards and policies for the safe design, construction,
maintenance and operation of commercial vessels and offshore
facilities. Issues Certificates of Documentation for U.S.
flagged vessels engaging in the coastwise, Great Lakes,
fishing and registry trades, and endorses documents for
recreational vessels.
Marine Licensing - Issues new, renewed and upgraded licenses
for officers and seamen. Regulates the manning of
commercial vessels, to ensure all vessels are adequately
manned with a minimum number of qualified crewmen to safely
operate the vessel.
Marine Science - Provides weather and oceanographic services
for other Coast Guard programs and federal services.
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Port Safety & Security - Safeguards ports, waterways,
waterfront facilities, vessels and people working in them,
from accidental or intentional damage, disruption,
destruction or injury. Manages port safety, port security
and environmental protection concerns.
Search and Rescue - Renders aid to people in distress and
property in the marine environment. Serves as maritime SAP.
coordinator within the National SAR Plan. Maintains SAR
facilities along U.S. coasts as well as Alaska, Hawaii and
the Great Lakes
.
Waterways Management - Involves the interrelationship
between three entities - ships, waterways and facilities
including docks, bridges, and piers.
These individual missions can be classified into four main
mission areas which are maritime law enforcement, maritime
safety, environmental protection and national security.
Within the maritime lav; enforcement mission area, there are
several "sub-missions" drug interdiction, fisheries
enforcement, alien interdiction (AMIO) and recreational
boating safety enforcement (RBS) - to name those of primary
importance
.
It is important to realize the ramifications for Coast
Guard units as they strive to be ready to respond to the wide
spectrum of missions listed above. Most federal regulatory or
law enforcement agencies are organized in such a way as to
perform along fairly specific missions. For example the U.S.
Customs Service assigns its agents to specific missions like
fraud or illegal exportation of technology. So at any given
time a Customs agent is primarily concerned with only a single
"mission", whereas a member of the Coast Guard is assigned to
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a unit that is expected to respond to a wide range of missions
on virtually a moment's notice.
The amount of time required for proper training of just
one mission is substantial. As a Coast Guard unit attempts to
establish valid training programs for each mission, the time
constraint becomes a major factor. Time becomes a very
limited resource for the unit when one considers that many
training requirements are not even mission related per se.
For example, underway Officer of the Deck (00D) and coxswain
qualifications are major training undertakings for most units.
D. REGIONAL MISSION DIVERSITY
We have shown that the Coast Guard has organizational
responsibility for approximately 12 different assigned
missions. The next factor we will look at is the geographic
regional mission diversity. As one moves from region to
region throughout the Coast Guard's area of responsibility,
the importance of each mission shifts. Accordingly, the
priorities and emphasis for each mission shifts between
geographic region.
There are numerous factors that effect the level of
activity for each Coast Guard mission in a particular
geographic region. The type and amount of marine resources,
the volume of maritime traffic, prevailing weather patterns
and commercial fishing needs are just a few of the factors
that will differ between regions.
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Let's focus briefly on the "big three" law enforcement
missions- drug interdiction, alien interdiction and fisheries
enforcement . Obviously the volume of fisheries enforcement
would be different when comparing the coastal regions of
Alaska and Delaware. Or, the alien interdiction effort would
be different on the Great Lakes compared to Southern
California. Or, the emphasis on drug interdiction will
clearly be different in Florida versus Oregon. The point is
that the Coast Guard needs to manage their law enforcement
missions with ardent consideration for the diversity between
geographic regions.
E. ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE
The Coast Guard has designed their organizational
structure in a way to meet the challenge of these regionally
diverse law enforcement missions. The Coast Guard's
organizational structure is depicted below in Figure 4-1:
Figure 4-1 is meant to show the administrative control in
general terms between the different levels of the chain of
command. The arrows indicate organizational structure, not
operational tasking for specific missions. The main point is
that there is a possibility of having 4 echelons above you in
the chain of command at certain units.
The Atlantic Area Commander is located in New York, NY,
while the Pacific Area Commander is in Alameda, CA. Each







District (1.2. 5. 7.8.9)
Air Stations
Groups
Patrol Boats & Stations
Figure 4- 1 Coast Guard Chain of Command
command and control responsibilities over units within their























The Commandant of the Coast Guard is a four star admiral
who is in that position for four years at a time. The area
commanders are three star admirals, while each district
commander is a one or two star admiral. Area and district
commanders normally serve for 2 or 3 years in those positions.
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F. COAST GUARD HEADQUARTERS, OPERATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT
DIVISION
The Operational Law Enforcement Division, (G-OLE) , is the
headquarters program manager for the law enforcement mission.
The Coast Guard uses two different methods to manage its
missions and units at the headquarters level . Certain
divisions at headquarters are designated as program managers,
while others are designated as facilities managers. (G-OLE)
is not a facility manager for any type of unit, so they must
often coordinate law enforcement program requirements with
other divisions who are facilities managers. For instance
there is a different facility manager for Coast Guard
aircraft, cutters and stations. This introduces yet another
factor of management difficulty due to competing goals of
program managers versus facility managers.
There are 4 branches in (G-OLE) . These branches are as
follows
:
(G-OLE-1) Plans and Analysis Branch
(G-OLE-2) Living Marine Resources Branch
(G-OLE-3) Interdiction Branch
(G-OLE-4) Standards and Support Branch
The Plans and Analysis Branch, (G-OLE-1), at Coast Guard
Headquarters is the sponsor of this research project. (G-OLE
-
1) has defined the strategic planning problems in the
following manner. (CDR R. Goodchild, 1993)
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1) The communication of ELT mission goals from the program
manager is inadequate and untimely.
2) The communication of resource requirements for missions
from operational commander to program manager is
inadequate and untimely.
3) In general, the communications linkage is unsatisfactory.
(G-OLE-1) has also described symptoms of the above
problems in the following way:
a) There have been instances of slow response to the
Commandant's desire to rebalance among mission areas.
b) The pendulum may have swung too far. Some circles
outside the Coast Guard believe we have virtually
abandoned the drug interdiction mission.
c) Congressional budget documents contain estimated workload
estimates provided by the program manager . The trend
analysis algorithm used in the past has proved inadequate
during periods of significant change. Valid operational
commander estimates are needed.
d) Congress routinely asks for projected workload during
review of budget submissions. Valid operational
commander estimates are again needed.
G. STRATEGIC PLANNING GOALS
(G-OLE-1) has defined the overall goal for improving the
strategic planning process for the law enforcement mission
this way: To design a planning and assessment system which
improves mission performance through better communications
between ELT program managers and the operational commanders.
The following were also identified as "needs" by (G-OLE-
1) :
- Better process to ensure the timely update of program
goals
- Program manager needs annual resource allocation
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- Program manager needs operational input tor long range
requirements
- Program manager &. operational commanders need to ensure
consistency
Figure 4-2 below shows the flow of information envisioned































Figure 4-2 Law Enforcement Strategic Planning & Communications
The following are desired characteristics of such a
system:
- guidance flows down the chain of command with
increasing specificity
- requirements flow up the chain of command
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- resources flow down the chain of command
- mission execution performed by operational units
- assessment of mission execution flows up
Furthermore, (G-OLE-1) identified the need to improve its
ability to measure the effectiveness of Coast Guard units
carrying out the law enforcement mission. Two broad goals
were established: 1) The need to link measures of
effectiveness (MOEs) with goals and objectives and 2) the need
to ensure vertical alignment of goals, objectives and MOEs.
The lines of communication that are displayed in Figure 4-
2 indicate an ambitious plan, yet this kind of information
flow is necessary to effectively manage the three major law
enforcement missions across various geographic regions.
Another factor that makes strategic planning difficult is the
changing emphasis on different mission areas brought on by
political forces and top Coast Guard leadership.
H. POLITICAL INFLUENCES
A good example of political forces causing planning
difficulties is happening in the Interdiction Branch, (G-OLE-
3) . That branch is responsible for developing the Coast
Guard's drug interdiction goals, strategies and policies.
This branch has had to wait for several months while the
Clinton administration works on their new drug control
strategy. This situation causes Coast Guard goals and
strategies to be delayed, which causes field units to be
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frustrated because they are unclear as to the level of
emphasis to give to a particular mission. The Interdiction
Branch chief gave these remarks on this issue:
The Democrats came into power with the notion that
change was needed. The idea was that things were wrong
and we need to change them. . . .Earlier this year, in about
April of 1993, the administration ordered a Presidential
Review Directive, PRD 18. This is a review of
Presidential Directive 18 from the previous
administration, which is the administration's policy for
the nation's counter-drug activities. The review's
purpose is to determine the new administration's counter-
drug policy. The National Security Council takes the
lead in this review process. Every federal law
enforcement agency that is concerned with the counter-
narcotic mission is also involved in the review. The
Coast Guard is heavily involved in the review process.
The various proposed changes are always hotly contested.
It was a process that should have taken about 6 weeks
.
It has now been over 6 months and the plan still has not
been finalized. When it is finalized, PRD 18 will become
PDD 18, which stands for Presidential Decision Directive
18. This will then constitute the administration's
policy
.
From the policy statement a strategy should be
developed. The responsibility for promulgating the
national strategy has been with the director of Office of
National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) . This position was
established in 1989 and has been referred to as the "Drug
Czar" . ONDCP has already developed a draft strategy
because they're trying to get ahead of the game. They
have a deadline of February 1994 for publication. They
have seen how long the PRD 18 process has taken, so they
have given the federal agencies an interim strategy that
is being staffed at Coast Guard Headquarters right now.
This will be an iterative process where we will probably
see several versions of the strategy. ONDCP is actually
putting the cart before the horse a little bit, because
the strategy should follow the policy.
Because of this review process the Coast Guard's
counter-narcotics strategy is in a bit of a holding
pattern while we wait for some of the more contentious
issues to be resolved. These issues for the most part
are classified at the secret level or higher. In a very
broad sense the issues deal with changes in how we as a
nation do business and how do we shift our emphasis and
resources. The Coast Guard's budget is being rolled
back, so there really is a question of what resources
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will the Coast Guard have left to implement a counter-
narcotics strategy.
This quote indicates that it is difficult to get mission
emphasis clarity when policy review takes so long. This
situation makes mission emphasis confusing for Coast Guard
middle managers and operating units.
I. CHANGING MISSION EMPHASIS
When a new Commandant takes command of the Coast Guard
every 4 years, he often has his own agenda of emphasis. Over
the past few years there has been increased emphasis on
protection of marine living resources and fisheries
enforcement . The current Commandant has wanted to get more
balance between the three main law enforcement missions due to
perceived shifts in emphasis at the national level between
drug enforcement, alien interdiction and fisheries
enforcement . To a certain extent he may have been successful
in that the annual budget dollars spent on the law enforcement
missions have grown closer to one another. These figures
reflect the percentages of annual Coast Guard operating
expense dollars spent on each mission in FY88 compared to
FY94 :
FY88 FY94
Drug Interdiction 23.1% 14.1%
Fisheries Enforcement 5.8% 12.6%
Alien Interdiction 5.1% 9.2%
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Thus far we have tried to paint a picture of the various
factors that are constraints on those who manage the resources
of the Coast Guard. Here is a summary listing of the
constraints that we have identified during our research:
- Responsibility for 12 different missions
- Geographic regional mission diversity
- Organizational structure
- 5 echelons to the chain of command
- Program manager versus facilities manager aims
- Changing leadership emphasis
- External organizational influences
It is important to be aware of these constraints
throughout this thesis because these constraints will not be
going away. The nature of the Coast Guard's multi-mission
responsibility and the other factors listed above mean that
the Coast Guard will always be confronted with changing
priorities. These constraints must be hurdled to achieve the




The preceding pages of this chapter have mainly been
objective descriptions of the missions and structure of the
Coast Guard. We have also included some descriptive planning
constraints and a strategic planning model that (G-OLE-1) is
striving towards. The next section of this chapter deals with
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the interview data collected for this research. Approximately
50 interviews were conducted of Coast Guard personnel at all
levels and locations of the law enforcement organization. The
purpose of the interviews was to identify pertinent issues and
constraints so that a survey could be developed to gather
additional data.
1. Communications Issues
We start with a quote by the Assistant Division Chief
of (G-OLE) . One can readily tell that this person has a
sincere desire to improve communications between the program
manager and the field units.
I have looked at the deficiencies of the way we
communicate with the field. High on my agenda is to
improve our communication to the field units. The law
enforcement conference we had last year was the first
attempt to get a definition of the communications
problem. We stood up in front of the people last year
and told them that communications both up and down the
chain of command were inadequate. We were using that
conference forum for the first opportunity to discuss
alternatives to improve the communications problem. The
problem was that once the conference was over we all went
back to our jobs and we didn't get closure on some of the
issues. However we have done a lot this year in defining
the problem. We have tried to push forward on our
strategic planning processes
.
It is significant to note that top management for the
law enforcement mission realizes there is a communications
problem. The difficulty is in developing a more constant
dialogue. It is a hard task to coordinate and communicate the
necessary information to the field so they can make the proper
planning decisions.
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It is a tough job to be in a position at a prominent
Coast Guard unit and have to make planning decisions without
a clear picture of what is important. An operations officer
at a Coast Guard air station has the responsibility of
allocating aircraft hours to various missions. An officer in
that position would like to make informed decisions planning
his unit's patrols. This becomes more of a guessing game,
though, if he is unclear about where to focus the units
efforts. This officer is able to look at the data he has on
how he used his aircraft last year, but he does not feel like
he has been receiving information that would enable him to
develop a plan to effectively use his aircraft in the future.
The communication breaks down between the global objectives
that the Commandant puts out in his vision statement and the
need for unit specific targets. The point of the following
quote from an operations officer at an air station in the
Pacific Area is to show the difficulty he has in planning his
future operations based on the current quality of
communications
:
In my opinion, the level of emphasis comes first from the
Commandant's vision. This has been very difficult to
translate into exact measures. The Commandant said I
want balance. Within a year he was looking at data
because he is a total quality type of guy, where he
measures performance with data. If mission areas were
skewed; for example if aviation units were still putting
more flight hours toward enforcement of drug laws and
treaties instead of balancing that with fisheries
enforcement, he would see that personally and physically
with his own eyes and say you're not hearing me. You're
not doing what I asked you to do. I think that's just a
flat communications problem. The staffs of the program
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managers need to have a vehicle to clearly translate
vision into program policy and direction. If there is a
missing ingredient, the difficulty is that some of the
levels of emphasis the Coast Guard has and some of the
mission areas we do are a function of legislation.
Legislation is a support area; the guys in the legal
department in headquarters probably route any legislation
that effects programs through various places within
headquarters. But it may not trickle down to the program
managers in a timely fashion . . . The people in program
administration may not have clear direction to the
operating programs showing them what the new targeted
level of effort should be. If there is a disconnect it
is between knowledge of what we are doing now compared to
what the new goal may be. It has to be very specific,
because in aviation every single mission is measured in
terms of tenths of flight hours. The real problem is
that I have great difficulty deciding how to plan
patrols. I think I should be using patrols hours that
line up with the Commandant's vision for law enforcement.
But like I said earlier it is not real clear how to do
that. If the Commandant wants the level of aviation
fisheries enforcement to increase, which he did say in
his very first year as Commandant, and he looks at the
numbers the next year and they didn't change; then he has
been frustrated and his message didn't get across. He
can go directly to the area commanders because they work
for him and can say: 'Hey you're not listening to me'.
Then they say: 'Wait a minute, the program manager, (G-
OLE) didn't tell me that'. This is the disconnect.
This quote reflects a view of a communications
disconnect between the Commandant and (G-OLE) . Other
interviews in the field indicate that planning is not in fact
linked to an understanding of the Commandant's vision for each
of the law enforcement missions; rather future planning of
operations is based on historical data.
Returning to the Coast Guard Headquarters, we find the
Assistant Chief of (G-OLE) expressing a desire improve his
divisions communications with the field. He recognizes how
constantly law enforcement priorities can change. In fact
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people at the headquarters level almost expect the priorities
to change. They have grown accustomed to this kind of
environment. Here are his remarks on this issue, which
reflect his desire for balance between the three main law
enforcement missions, the communication of broad mission
perspectives and being "in tune" with national concerns:
We want to communicate to the area and district
commanders that they have a responsibility to prosecute
three missions in support of ELT. But really it is even
broader than that. There are environmental regulations,
fish & wildlife regulations and marine sanctuary
regulations to enforce also. We spend the most time on
the big three - alien interdiction, drug interdiction and
fisheries enforcement. All we want to communicate to
them is the sense we get from the Commandant, Congress
and any grass roots organizations about these missions.
I don't want to play the missions off against each
other. I just want the field to hear the public's
sense. I really don't want to encourage the field to
assign priorities to the 3 main mission areas. Because
they are responsible for enforcing all three. The lower
in the food chain you go the more detail will need to be
communicated. Broad perspectives need to be communicated
at the higher levels. Fiscal year objectives should be
communicated from headquarters to the area commands. We
should say to them: 'Here's what we see the
administration, Congress and the people requiring of us
this year '
.
Our discussions with the area commands about mission
priorities have been real ad hoc. If you look at the
Coast Guard's budget as a pie, ELT gets about 30% of the
operating expense (OE) money. If we were in a good
balance, 10% would be assigned to each of the big 3 ELT
missions. Maybe we move between those mission categories
based on changes in the environment . Now, the commandant
reacts to feedback from Congress and the administration
on developing the importance of different things. Drug
interdiction, for example, is forecast to be down to
about 14% of the ELT resource allocation. I think the
commandant feels that percentage reflects the
administration's priorities. But we don't want to be in
a position of telling the operational commander at the
beginning of the year: 'Here are your targets', because
that could change tomorrow. AMIO is a perfect example.
We have had cutters locked up in Operation Able Manner
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since the beginning of the year, so the numbers at the
end of the year will probably be skewed towards the AMIO
mission. The point is that Able Manner wasn't driven by
headquarters; it wasn't driven by any strategic planning.
It was a function of having resources available to apply
to that mission area. The national demand was such that
we had to allocate resources to meet that demand.
This quote shows the concern that headquarters has in
improving communications, yet the majority of our interview
data with field units indicated no noticeable improvement to
date. While the intent of headquarters on this issue is
noteworthy, there seems to be difficulty in identifying
specific processes which will improve strategic
communications
.
2 . Organizational Structure Issues
Whereas the staff at Headquarters see these changing
mission priorities as responses to changing national demand,
those stationed in the field may not have the same perception.
An officer stationed at a district law enforcement office can
be frustrated with the constraints of changing mission
priorities and the organizational structure. Here we can see
that the organizational structure of the Coast Guard seems to
cause difficulties with the flow of communications. This
person is in a position where he feels time pressure quite
often to complete law enforcement missions. Because of time
constraints, he feels it is necessary to bypass the area
command staff and deal directly with the headquarters staff.
His opinion is that the area staff adds little value to the
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substance of a particular policy guidance item. The time
crunch is not improved when the perception in the field is
that the commandant is making operational decisions himself.
This individual is also feeling pressure in that he
wants to be able to give operational units specific guidance
pertaining their conduct during a law enforcement mission. In
the case of the Haitian embargo, he had to wait up to the last
minute to get the information needed. Here again there is a
reference to the problems of working through the area command.
In this case, it appears that the district staff is frustrated
by the organizational structure rather than helped by it
.
This quote is from an officer at a district law enforcement
office
:
The Area is in the chain of command, but it is not a very
smooth link, because our role and their role is not
clearly defined. A lot of times on policy issues we go
directly to the commandant. That makes area very angry.
I've personally been on phone calls and phone patches
with the Chief of Operations in HQ with about 14 other
people on the line and the admiral will ask: 'Did you
tell Area this?', and I'll say: 'No'. Then I call up
area afterwards, after the fact, and they get mad. It is
impossible to distinguish between the operational and
tactical stuff that area is supposed to do and the policy
type stuff the commandant is supposed to do. What has
happened in the last year or so is that in the law
enforcement arena the commandant personally has driven
the decision makers much more to his own office. He
personally approves all Statements of No Objection (SNO)
.
Any SNO that needs the commandant's approval goes to the
commandant himself. (G-0) can't approve them, (G-OLE)
can't approve them, they all go to him. I'm not being
critical; that's his choice of running things the way he
wants to. But, the spin-off is that his staff is much
more interested in the daily minutia than they used to be
or should be. You have to take area out of the loop. I
could give you a half dozen different examples. Recent
ones like the Haitian embargo, Cuban alien migration,
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Haitian migrants and Cubans in the Bahamas. . . The way it
is written is that area should be the operational and
tactical commander, but it doesn't function very well
that way. Area tries, but they are often a day late and
a dollar short. In practice area seems to add no value
to the process. A perfect example is the recent United
Nations Security Council embargo that prohibited the
importation of oil into Haiti. We saw this coming; we
knew this was going to be signed. We knew this was going
to go into effect and we knew we were the logical people
to enforce it, because we were already in force around
Haiti. We had a standing maritime force around Haiti. . .
The problem was that there were a lot of nuances involved
with enforcing this embargo. We did not have enforcement
authority, we cannot stop vessels by force, and we can't
shoot at them. The sanctions against people breaking
this embargo are very limited. It was based on the flag
state. A lot of details had to be worked out before we
could enforce this thing. For instance, what were we
supposed to do when a tanker is sighted heading toward
Haiti. Nobody knew what to do, and quite frankly we
still are not real clear. Headquarters needs to tell us
what to do. We position the ships and the people and
provide them with air cover and logistics like we're
supposed to. Then they find a tanker; So what do we do?
Well, in the whole planning process we knew for a couple
of weeks what this resolution was going to say before it
went into effect. We worked through area, very
f rustratingly , and (G-OLE) trying to get some substantive
guidance. It's not (G-OLE) 's fault; they can't make up
policy, they have to get it from National Security
Council and the State Department. They did not get any
guidance from these other agencies. Then the embargo
went into effect. We had absolutely no written guidance
on the street - none. We and area had drafted up a huge
operations order, which was essentially worthless. We
did this without any significant guidance from the
commandant on what we ought to be saying in the OPORDER.
We've gotten real good at generating reams of paperwork
that don't say much. This is a perfect example of where
the commandant never came down and said what he wanted us
to do. In fact the way this thing came down is like
this .. .Midnight on a Wednesday before the embargo was to
take effect, the Chief of Operations was on the phone
with the District Commander. So there is a handful of
staff officers listening in on this phone patch where (G-
0) tells us what to do. Then we got on the satellite
communications to tell the operational units what to do.
So we had nothing but verbal guidance and area wasn't
even in the loop. That's not the way it should happen.
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The point of this quote is to show the difficulty that
a district has with the chain of command. On the one hand,
they are receiving policy guidance from the program manager at
headquarters, while at the same time receiving operational
direction from the area commander. Receiving guidance from
two different sources when performing major operations is
inefficient, and in practice does not work.
3 . Strategic Context Issues
This last quote brings out the important point that
there is quite often "nuances" involved with law enforcement
tasking. It seems that understanding the nuances of a
strategy or policy is vital to the proper execution of a
mission. We found some evidence that field units did not
always receive a clear picture of this type of communication.
Here, another district law enforcement staff officer comments
on this notion:
I think pretty much, the immediate shake is that we're
pretty good on coming to grips with what the policy may
be all the way down to the district level, but passing
that to the unit level, we may not be so good at. We
pass information by voice to the unit commander, followed
up with a message giving him guidance in hard copy form.
Unfortunately this does not always communicate some of
the nuances of the policy. We don't assume that because
we sent a message to the CO., that the guy actually
doing the boarding has a handle on the new policy. We
get message traffic returned in the form of SITREPS,
which is the same thing you guys do; that tends to be a
bit sterile, because you don't bitch in hard copy. It
would be most effective for us to visit a unit after an
operation, and sit down with them in a room and do a
debrief. That would be the best way to see if the policy
was communicated into an actionable item in the field,
57
but unfortunately we can't do that due to time and budget
constraints
.
As we collected our interview data, it gradually
became clear that the Coast Guard members stationed in the
field really wanted to have more information about a mission
than just the tasking. This is consistent with our Chapter
III literature review pertaining to strategic commitment.
Personnel performing the law enforcement missions felt unable
to properly execute a particular mission because they lacked
information that was more strategic in nature. Here an
enlisted boarding team member stationed on a Pacific Area high
endurance cutter describes his frustration:
This last incident we had off of Ensenada with the
Chinese, there were 14 of us that lived on that boat 24
hours a day, for the whole 12 days. We never left.
You're sleeping on the deck, you've got cockroaches
running on you, you can't take showers, and you're eating
MREs . The boarding party was holding together as far as
morale, and not letting their guard down, but after a
while when we weren't getting any information, and the
ship was just doing circles in the Pacific, the captain
began to get frustrated. We were the on scene commander,
but had no idea what direction to give our units. Nobody
on the boarding team knew who was making the decisions on
this alien matter; we didn't know who to get mad or
frustrated at. We knew we were enforcing INS laws, but
not where decisions were coming from. All we knew was
that the President was in Japan, and the vice-President
wasn't going to make a decision until he reviewed the
President's policy on immigration. NSC and INS seemed to
be making on the spot decisions.
The frustration expressed in this interview is a
symptom of lack of understanding of the strategic context. If
Coast Guard personnel were apprised of the strategic issues
that surround this case, much of this frustration could be avoided.
4. Changing Priorities
The (G-OLE) staff at headquarters was able to
articulate how quickly the law enforcement priorities changed
for the Coast Guard as a whole. The (G-OLE) staff members we
interviewed were quick to point out that they were trying to
achieve a dynamic balance between the main 3 law enforcement
missions. As stated earlier, they had a good grasp of the
factors that shift the Coast Guard's law enforcement emphasis.
It is unclear how well the field units understand this notion.
This quote from the Assistant Division Chief of (G-OLE) gives
insight into the view that those at headquarters have:
We don't like to be event driven. Over the last 6 months
during the Chinese alien migration we were continually
being given guidance from the top. But we don't want to
operate that way for the long haul. I was at an aviation
law enforcement conference at Atlantic Area recently.
During the course of that conference I was told that the
Atlantic Area staff had given the Chinese migrant
interdiction mission the highest priority of any law
enforcement mission. Only search and rescue cases were
given a higher priority. I really almost hate to see
that. I hate to have it come out as a precept. The
priorities for these law enforcement missions are
dynamic. Tomorrow it could be Cuban interdiction. If
there was a mass migration from Cuba, we would drop
everything and respond to that. That call should be made
in the field. We here have a responsibility for
providing the resources for the field to do their jobs.
We go lobby for the billets, resources and gas for the
field to go do the job. We should provide the framework
and the policy for the field. Once we have identified
the missions the field units are to do, we want them to
prioritize them. They are the regional experts. Going
through the senior operational commander, we want them to
prioritize the missions by specific geographic region.
The mission priorities will change from one district to
the next. The senior operational commander should have
a dialogue with the districts about how the resources
will be used. Then I think, we at headquarters should be
able to know how the resources will be used.
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(G-OLE) wants the field unit echelons to prioritize
the law enforcement missions based on the regional
expediencies . We found some uncertainty on the part of field
units about what the law enforcement priorities were. To be
sure, field units had a different view of what Headquarters
would label a dynamic balance. Many Coast Guard personnel we
interviewed were uncertain about law enforcement priorities
and therefore had difficulty planning effective patrols or
other mission prosecution activities. This comment from a
station law enforcement petty officer indicates a certain
amount of cynicism about the prioritization of the law
enforcement missions:
Mission priority guidance is poor, because it is the
mission of the moment for the most part, and usually not
tasked in consideration of the other missions. It's like
I said, what ever is important to the hierarchy at the
moment. Actually I am speaking of the Washington
hierarchy. Whether we perceive fish, drugs, or aliens to
be the highest priority at the moment, shifts regularly.
Are resources are finite, there are no other, and this
puts a real crimp in our planning cycle. Let me put it
to you this way: headquarters is made up of several
program managers. Each program manager has mission and
guidance responsibility for each area, but they don't, at
least to our way of thinking down here in the trenches,
talk to each other when it comes to mission allocation.
Everybody expects you to do constantly expanding
missions
.
5. Policy Timeliness Issue
Field units often feel the effect when various factors
act as constraints on the Coast Guard's strategic planning and
policy making abilities. The time lag that occurs between
strategy formulation at headquarters and tactical action at
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the operating units can often be a stumbling block to
effective operations. Here is an example of a district law
enforcement staff officer who has difficulty putting together
consistent guidance to the units under his control:
What's lagging on our part in the district, and I think
equates over to headquarters for a lot of the law
enforcement missions, is having a current directive
that's up to date, so that all policy guidance can be
found in one location. For example, right now the
Maritime Law Enforcement Manual (MLEM) is being updated,
and it has been in revision for years. Right now, we
just have a million pieces of paper that should be
included in the OPORDER, that aren't. You have to be
like kind of a pack rat, but the guys in the field have
been a little frustrated because our lack of concise
direction to them. From district to district, that's
kind of the way I think things are happening. Each
district law enforcement shop has a lot of say on where
they put the emphasis of their enforcement efforts.
6 . Planning Issues
We found that patrol boats and stations in particular
had difficulty planning effective patrols in light of their
uncertainty over priorities. Station of f icers-in-charge and
patrol boat commanding officers do not receive specific
tasking like cutters do before they go on a patrol. The
result was that certain units were making decisions in
somewhat of a vacuum. Here two patrol boat commanding
officers comment on this notion:
I think for the most part, the tasking we get is fairly
clear. Sometimes though, it's somewhat unrealistic given
our resources and operational environment conditions.
Particularly with this last year, and the additional
missions we were given like migrants, I've felt very
resource constrained. From how many hours I have to be
underway, to how often they want me to get underway with
the short notice time that I received, I've had to make
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my own decisions out on patrol about whether to
concentrate on a migrant versus a narcotics prosecution.
To do one optimally, I've got to make a trade off with
the other, and I'm not really sure which one takes
priority. For example, last week on patrol, I decided to
patrol possible drug trafficking routes instead of known
alien migration areas. I'm still not certain this was
the right decision.
I pretty much determine mission priorities based on
personal preference. For instance the Commercial Fishing
Vessel Safety Act regulations are new, so I feel like I
should be out enforcing them ... I make up my own
schedule. The group actually puts out guidance directing
me to get underway a certain amount of hours. This
guidance comes out in message format and it is encoded.
To tell you the truth, I haven't decoded one of those
messages in a about a year and a half. I make up my own
schedules. We get underway when I say. We board the
boats that I want to board. There is a district
instruction on law enforcement planning. Basically, for
drug interdiction you conduct random boardings unless you
have intelligence and you interdict on standard travel
routes. The instruction is very vague and as far as I am
concerned, it is non-applicable. If I thought there were
very many drugs being smuggled into southern California
by pleasure boats and not on tankers or aircraft, then I
would do more drug interdiction boardings, but I don't
see that happening. The way I see things in this group
is that each unit commander does what he thinks he should
do
. . .
I plan our patrols in 2-3 day shots and I decide on
my own what is the priority for a particular patrol.
7 . Measures of Effectiveness
The staff in (G-OLE) was very concerned with being
able to articulate measures of effectiveness for the law
enforcement missions. This is an important topic because a
federal agency like the Coast Guard receives funding from
Congress for programs based on effectiveness. Their is a
realization in (G-OLE) that quantitative measures do not tell
the whole story of effectiveness for law enforcement missions.
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The Assistant (G-OLE) Division Chief tells us his view of this
issue
:
In general all we have been doing and the way we've
managed programs in the past, is to collect trailing
data. Then we show how we used stuff, which is purely
reactive. There has been no process up until last year
when he held our first law enforcement conference. This
was when we started a dialogue on looking to the future
and what we will need to be doing, instead of just
reporting what we did.
People like to take things to the objective level.
Nobody wants to stand up and make subjective statements
on the value of what they're doing. Congress very
specifically asks us to fill in numbers in an equation.
They'll ask how many cutter-days per pound of cocaine
were achieved. Our attitude here is: we're going to
have to 'answer the mail'. But this kind of purely
quantitative analysis is meaningless, and it bothers us
to do it. When we have been asked by Congress if we are
effective, I want us to answer in terms of how well
coordinated we are. This is primarily on the drug side
of things. We have had significant improvement in our
liaisons with the other federal law enforcement agencies.
We have tried very specifically not to toot our own
horns. We try to show that most interdictions are the
result of interagency cooperation. We want the people of
the United States to see that there is cooperation taking
place at these levels. We spend a lot of time setting up
infrastructure to dialogue with other agencies. We
realize that human nature often wants to take issues like
measuring effectiveness to a simple black and white
level
.
(G-OLE) primarily focuses on quantitative measures
because Congressional inquiries always seem to be framed
that way. We would prefer to deal more in qualitative
measures of effectiveness, but these kinds of measures
don't have credibility on Capitol Hill.
This preoccupation with quantitative measures has
filtered out into the field. Some Coast Guard members
stationed at operational units are frustrated because
resources are taken away from them based on operational
commanders inability or unwillingness to consider qualitative
measures of effectiveness. A high ranking officer at a unit
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with drug interdiction as its main mission describes for us
what this is like:
To operate our air intercept system effectively, I know
that I need 3 HU-25s on standby in the Caribbean. Lately
some of my aircraft are being pulled out for the alien
migration interdiction mission. I've got no problem with
that . I do have a problem with the way area tries to
measure my effectiveness. They look at the hours flown
for one of my interceptors that sits on the ground in a
readiness status and wonder how come not that many hours
are flown. I try to explain to them that I need those
intercept aircraft to have a full tank of fuel and a
fresh crew. The aircraft act as a deterrent. We have
data that tells us there are smuggling flight trying to
fly into the Gulf of Mexico within minutes of one of our
aircraft going down for emergency repairs. The area just
looks at hours flown or seizures for a measure of
effectiveness. They don't seem to understand what
effectiveness means when it comes to air interdiction.
When operational commanders do not grasp what the
realities of mission effectiveness are out in the field, it
can result in resources being used ineffectively. We found
that a "quota" mentality would begin to creep into the field
units if there was only emphasis placed on quantitative data.
It seems that an insightful law enforcement strategy takes a
back seat to just running up numbers of boardings or seizures.
There is no link of a strategy to a particular set of
objectives. These remarks from group operations officer and
a station law enforcement petty officer are interesting:
The last two years we have put in a pretty hard core law
enforcement effort. But, basically the guidance for this
increased law enforcement effort was just: 'Get underway
and do a lot of boardings.' Basically that's all we do
unless we have specific intelligence about somebody
coming in with contraband. But you get very little of
that kind of information. We just go out and do the mass
boarding routine. And this strategy really didn't do
anything for us. We didn't get more seizures or more
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anything out of this effort. Very rarely do you come up
with a cold, 'no-intel' bust. Almost every time there is
a seizure it is because of intelligence. I've been
involved in 19 drug busts and all of them were
intelligence hits.... We did 1,000 boardings last year.
We tried to maximize the number of boardings we did last
year, and all that can be said of that effort is that we
shouldn't have done it.
I was representing our group commander at a recent
commanding officers conference held at the district
office. The district law enforcement division chief was
showing us a chart that had dots strewn all over the
district's area of operations. The dots represented
boardings done during the past year. He pointed out that
the dots were all rather close to the coast line. He
then proceeded to basically chastise all of us about
this. He told us he wanted us to go further out to sea
to conduct our boardings. Well, the reason there are so
many more boardings conducted close to the coast is
because that is where the boats are. There are very few
boats out further to sea. The problem with this 'logic'
was that he considered his chart with the dots to be
intelligence. It was not intelligence, it was just data.
Rather than seeking the unit commanders input on the
matter, new tasking came out at the meeting like that.
What a waste of our resources
.
There is a negative effect on the attitude of field
personnel when they sense that the missions they are
performing are driven mainly by the need to build data. When
this notion is in place, it diverts the field personnel from
using their own local knowledge to perform missions they see
vital. It seems that the personnel in the field would prefer
to understand the strategic reason behind the mission so that
they can derive a sense of meaningfulness from their tasks
.
This quote from a station XPO illustrates this kind of
frustration
:
You want to know things that I find are not as they
should be. . .Our tasking here now is that. . .well it seems
like emphasis has shifted to living marine resources. . .to
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the extent that they want us to show hours in that area,
and they want us to show hours in that area so badly. .
.
that the tasking has come down that any time our boat
leaves the dock and is underway inside the reef line, we
log those hours as ELT-Marine Sanctuaries, no matter what
we're doing. So if we're doing a SAR case and then it
comes time to fill out the abstract, we claim that as one
mission and one sortie for SAR with the associated
resource hours. Then we log one sortie for ELT-Marine
Sanctuaries because we were operating within a sanctuary
area. Now what this does is packs our ELT-Sanctuaries
mission hours right up to the top, and in reality it
accomplishes absolutely nothing. This is because we are
not dedicating any of our resources to enforcing marine
sanctuary regulations. Our unit just happened to be in
the area; even to the extent that the tasking memo we
received directed cutters to log their transit time from
the pier out to the sea buoy as ELT-Sanctuaries. I can
understand the need to show we are doing something about
it. It's just that these hours are empty numbers, it's
hollow, it doesn't mean anything .... The word has come
down to show hours in this area... It's depressing to
think we're not actually doing anything. They're telling
us the emphasis has shifted, so make it look like we've
shifted along with it. At no point have they suggested
to us that we should spend more time in the back country
of the threatened marine sanctuary areas . The tasking
was just to show the numbers.
It is obvious from this quote that commitment to a
particular law enforcement mission will diminish when it is
evident that operations are based on quantity of hours versus
quality of prosecution. This is important for the leaders and
managers of the Coast Guard to understand - missions driven
purely by numbers have a negative impact on operating morale.
As noted earlier, the demands of Congress or the
Executive Branch for quantitative data drives (G-OLE) to focus
on numerical standards for measures of effectiveness. The
Assistant (G-OLE) Division Chief feels it is important for the
lower echelons to have some understanding of the external
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influences that steers the Coast Guard's emphasis. There is
a sense that field personnel would be able think and behave in
line with emerging strategy if they understood the "big
picture" better. This quote indicates that feeling.
So it is very important that the area and district staffs
have the same sense of these external influences that we
in headquarters have. Our job should be to communicate
to the lower echelons what those external influences are.
There is another important ingredient here also. Let me
give you an analogy. If you want someone to do something
for you, and you don't coordinate with them ahead of
time, and they had no idea that you wanted something,
then the opportunity for you to be on target is
relatively low. We always try to give people a 'heads
up' in advance of some new initiative. It is a
coordinated process, then we get back to the conference
idea as a way to have a dialogue with the field about
these external influences we talked about earlier. Then
the operators who have the regional expertise know
whether or not an initiative will apply to them. These
operating units can then feed information back to their
operational commanders about how a certain initiative
will affect them. They will also be able to discuss the
resource requirements for achieving the particular
initiative. The area commanders then should assimilate
all this feedback so they can discuss resource
requirements for the entire area for the coming year.
From this quote it can be seen that headquarters
has a clear vision of the type of strategic communications
that should occur, but as noted earlier, there is a lack of
clarity when it comes to developing a process to improve
communication of the "big picture".
8 . Strategic Understanding
One group commander that we interviewed told of
receiving mixed messages from his operational commander with
regards to the fisheries mission. On the one hand Coast Guard
units are expected to enforce pertinent fisheries regulations.
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In the meantime units are told not to interfere with fishing
vessels too often so as not to disrupt commercial fishermens'
ability to make a living. Field commanders need to be in tune
with the different shades of a published Coast Guard policy.
Here this group commander shares a story relating to a
fisheries enforcement incident:
I don't know what district wants from me on fisheries.
The other day one of our patrol boats was preparing to do
a fisheries boarding on a fishing vessel. The master of
the fishing vessel displayed a weapon and did not allow
the Coast Guard personnel to board his boat. I notified
the district office of the situation and asked if they
had any particular guidance. A short while later the
district came back wanting to know if I wanted the
district office to create a fake SAR call so that we
could divert our patrol boat away from the law
enforcement incident in progress. I couldn't believe
that is what they asked me. Apparently they did not want
to have an "incident" on their hands. So, that leaves me
wondering just what level of intensity do they want from
me in fisheries enforcement. The bottom line is that I
get mixed messages about the level of intensity and
importance I am to place on the enforcement of fisheries
regulations
.
Finally we discovered a certain amount of opinion
that the law enforcement missions crowded out the
opportunities to perform other Coast Guard missions. Field
units are having to make decisions about cutting out planned
hours for other missions. This indicates that possibly the
field commanders are not apprised of the relative priorities
of missions. Here an air station operations officer discusses
this issue:
Law enforcement takes up a lot of our flight time.
There's no doubt about it. To the point where we are
often asked to combine missions or even delete missions
that we have traditionally flown in an effort to provide
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even more law enforcement flight hours. Sometimes that
does make me stop and think about the other things we
have to do with our aircraft, whether it be logistics
support for outlying units or other support missions. I
think we've kind of whittled things down to a point now
where we've probably got as many law enforcement flights
going out of Kodiak as we would really want to fly. If
we made any other cuts in any other mission areas, we
would start to affect the way we can support other units.
For example, we fly a medical flight once a week from
Kodiak to Anchorage. That aircraft is normally not
filled with medical patients, so it provides a good space
availability flight for personnel and their families to
get off the island. There have been considerations in
cutting flights like that. It's kind of hard to stand up
and talk about morale flights compared to law enforcement
flights, but I think it is important. . . D17 (ole) is kind
of like a ravenous tiger. Regardless of the number of
flight hours you throw at them, they want more.
This chapter has first of all tried to identify some of
the many factors that act as constraints on the Coast Guard.
Many of these constraints are a part of the nature of the
Coast Guard as an organization, while other constraints are
indigenous to the environment in which the Coast Guard
operates. There is little that can be done about these two
types of organizational constraints.
Our interview data sheds light on other issues that
constrain the Coast Guard's ability to function effectively.
These issues are due to problems in the organization that can
be resolved. These themes are important because they can be
improved upon by the leaders and managers of the Coast Guard.
One theme relates to the need for useful measures of
effectiveness and efficient utilization of resources. Quite
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often the interview data revealed that field personnel were
aware of law enforcement missions that were being driven by a
desire to "pad the numbers" by upper level management. While
this type of scenario may be happening across the whole
spectrum of the federal government, it is not a healthy trend
in the long run. When field personnel who are tasked to
perform the various law enforcement missions do not operate
with a clear understanding of how their effectiveness is being
measured, they lose commitment to the mission.
Closely linked to this theme is the need to improve
the clarity of law enforcement mission performance standards
and goals. Not only did field personnel struggle to measure
their effectiveness, but they were not often clear on the
expectations and objectives they were supposed to accomplish.
In this regard, the Coast Guard personnel we interviewed were
very committed to the Coast Guard's role in law enforcement,
but they were unclear as to the "big picture" objectives for
a given law enforcement mission.
In general, most personnel that were interviewed were
dissatisfied with the timeliness and effectiveness of law
enforcement policy coming from above them in the chain of
command. Field personnel many times were expected to carry
out intricate law enforcement missions without the benefit of
current guidance. Even when policy was promulgated in a
timely manner, the nuances of certain policies were difficult
for field personnel to interpret . Certain field personnel
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expressed a desire to give feedback to their chain of command.
They wanted to be able to validate which policies worked and
which didn ' t
.
Due to the kinds of communications problems that were
just discussed, field units often were not clear on the level
of emphasis to assign to competing law enforcement missions.
Unit commanders and operations personnel were sometimes in a
quandary when deciding which law enforcement mission was more
important at a given point in time.
Some of the problems that have been discussed can be
attributed to the political influences inherent with a federal
agency. This is to say that Coast Guard leaders and managers
may not be able to develop timely guidance due to politically
motivated setbacks. The personnel in (G-OLE) understood this
constraint to be the "nature of the beast", whereas field
personnel were not as in touch with this issue.
The bottom line of this discussion is to point out
that these themes constrict the exchange of ideas which
ultimately degrades the Coast Guard's ability to perform
strategic planning. Without receiving quality input from the
field, (G-OLE) is not going to be able to plan for the future
with long term strategically focused goals.
The next chapter takes the interview themes identified
in this chapter and puts together a survey to collect larger
amounts of data. It will be interesting to see how the
qualitative and quantitative data integrate.
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V. QUANTITATIVE METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS
A. SURVEY DESIGN
Using themes extracted from our interviews with
Headquarters, Area, District, Group, Station, Air Station,
WHEC, WMEC , and WPB personnel, we designed a survey (Appendix
A) of 33 questions. All but one of the survey questions were
grouped into nine constructs for further analysis. These
constructs were based on themes and conclusions found in our
Chapter IV qualitative analysis. The constructs that were
developed based on this qualitative analysis, and the
applicable survey questions that apply, will be addressed
later in this chapter.
As will be shown below, the survey questions were not
ordered numerically by construct. This was done intentionally
in the survey design, so that an individual completing a
survey would not get into a one answer mode with regards to a
particular construct.
Demographic information was included at the top of each
survey (Appendix A) which would allow us to analyze survey
results for the various echelons within the Coast Guard law
enforcement community. This demographic data was also used to
gain some insight as to where communications or strategy
development and execution might be improved upon as
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information flows up and down the chain of command. The
response scale to the questions was a five point Likert-type
format. On the cover letter that was attached to the survey,
recipients were advised to circle the number three for
instances in which they were undecided, lacked knowledge on
the question, the question was not applicable to their current
command, or questions for which they had no comment
.
B. SURVEY ADMINISTRATION
To get a statistically significant or valid amount of
sample data about the different echelons in the Coast Guard
law enforcement chain of command, and yet to keep the data
manageable, the survey was sent to Coast Guard units randomly
throughout the country, see Table 5-1:
TABLE 5-1
REPRESENTATION OF SURVEYED UNITS COAST GUARD WIDE







District 12 9 o 18
Group 4 5 "3 2 78
Station 156 47 1 47
Air
Station
26 21 1 21
WHEC 11 11 9 22
WMEC 37 31 1 31
WPB 83 42 1 42
TOTALS 372 198 265
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From Table 5-1, 198 total units were surveyed, with a
total of 265 surveys being mailed to these activities.
C. STATISTICAL DATA ANALYSIS
Completed surveys were returned by 170 individuals,
yielding an overall response rate of 64.2 percent. Table 5-2
provides the complete response data and rates for our survey
data:
TABLE 5-2
REPRESENTATION OF COAST GUARD WIDE SURVEY RESULTS





Area 2 6 2 33.3
District 12 18 12 66.7
Group 45 78 34 43.6
Station 156 47 44 93.6
Air
Station
26 21 15 71.4
WHEC 11 22 6 27.3
WMEC 37 31 28 90.3
WPB 83 42 29 69.0
The data from the surveys were manually entered into a
data base and analyzed using Statistical Package for the
Social Sciences (SPSS) software package. Our overall
representation of 64.2 percent, and the breakdown percentage
representation for the various echelons in the law enforcement
community, as represented in Table 5-2, achieved our goal of
at least 30% response rate from all levels, with the exception
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of WHECs . Based on the numbers of returned surveys, we
concluded our results to be representative.
D. DATA REDUCTION
To efficiently analyze the data and as noted above, it was
necessary to identify a small number of scaled variables
relevant to the research questions. A priori groupings of
items were formed based on the foundation of our qualitative
analysis. We believed these groupings would aid in developing
a model for communications, and strategic development and
implementation with respect to Coast Guard law enforcement.
The scaled variables that we developed are the same as the
construct grouping of themes
.
Table 5-3 presents the overall survey results by
construct, with the constructs listed by means in ascending
order. Review of Table 5-3 indicates a general disagreement
that the Coast Guard understands political influence
(construct IX) , has effective strategic planning (construct
VIII) or has effective resource management programs (construct
I)
. It also reveals the most agreement that the Coast Guard's
mission priorities are clear (construct II), that performance
standards are clear (construct V) and that policy guidance and
feedback is effective (construct IV) . An overall pattern can
be seen in that although Coast Guard personnel scored desired
outcome variables high, they scored some of the variables
which are inputs to these output variables as low, leaving
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room for improvement in the strategy development and
implementation process.
TABLE 5-3
CONSTRUCT BY TOTAL SURVEY RESPONDENTS
MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS
ASCENDING MEAN ORDERED
CONSTRUCT MEAN STD DEV N
IX 2 .74 1.07 170
VIII 2.80 0.75 170
I 2.85 0.78 170
III 3.24 0.75 170
VII 3 .27 0.74 170
VI 3.32 0.63 170
IV 0.72 170
V 3.40 0.64 170
II 3 .41 0.59 170
Perhaps of more value at this point is the use of these
constructs in developing a model to improve strategic planning
and implementation. Reliability coefficients (Cronbach's
alpha) were calculated on the scaled variables (constructs) to
determine their internal consistency. In all cases the
resulting coefficients were sufficiently high to justify the
use of the construct in further analysis. Table 5-4 provides
the constructs (scaled variables), alpha coefficients, and
specific questions in each construct.
76
TABLE 5-4
CONSTRUCTS, ALPHA COEFFICIENTS, AND SPECIFIC QUESTIONS
I) ADEQUACY, DISTRIBUTION, AND MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS
(MOE) OF RESOURCE UTILIZATION (alpha = .51)
Q6 . My Coast Guard unit has enough resources
to carry out its law enforcement missions effectively.
Q7 . Resources are proportionately distributed
to Coast Guard operational units based on the magnitude of
their missions.
Q22. The Coast Guard has valid measures of
effectiveness for its law enforcement missions which are
helpful at my unit
.
II) MISSION PRIORITY CLARITY/FIT (alpha = .66)
Q8 . Law enforcement policy guidance is
consistent, and is conveyed uniformly down the chain of
command
.
Q13 . Law enforcement objectives for the Coast
Guard fisheries mission are clear for my unit .
Q14 . Law enforcement objectives for the Coast
Guard counter- narcotics mission are clear for my unit.
Q15. Lav; enforcement objectives for the Coast
Guard AMIO mission are clear for my unit.
Q16. Lav; enforcement objectives for the Coast
Guard RBS mission are clear for my unit.
Q23. Law enforcement missions fit well with
the other missions at my Coast Guard unit.
Q27 . Coast Guard law enforcement mission





CONSTRUCTS, ALPHA COEFFICIENTS, AND SPECIFIC QUESTIONS
III) POLICY AND GUIDANCE COMMUNICATION (alpha = .74)
Ql . The communication of Coast Guard law
enforcement policy to my unit is timely.
Q2 . The communication of Coast Guard law
enforcement policy to my unit is clear.
Q24. Coast Guard law enforcement objectives
are developed and communicated to my unit in a timely
manner
.
Q33. My unit has been provided tactical
intelligence "products" that are useful.
IV) POLICY AND GUIDANCE FEEDBACK (alpha = .65)
Q3 . My Coast Guard unit is able to give and
receive feedback on law enforcement missions in a timely
manner
Q4 . My Coast Guard unit is able to give and
receive feedback on law enforcement missions in a clear
manner
Q31. Coast Guard law enforcement program
managers provide my unit guidance at the right time to
effectively and efficiently
carry out ELT mission responsibilities.
V) PERFORMANCE STANDARDS CLARITY (alpha = .49)
Q9 . Law enforcement procedures for my Coast
Guard unit's fisheries mission are clear.
Q10. Law enforcement procedures for my Coast
Guard unit's counter-narcotics mission are clear.
Qll. Law enforcement procedures for my Coast
Guard unit's AMIO mission are clear.
Q12 . Law enforcement procedures for my Coast
Guard unit's RBS mission are clear for.
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TABLE 5-4 (continued)
CONSTRUCTS, ALPHA COEFFICIENTS, AND SPECIFIC QUESTIONS
VI) POLICY EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY (alpha = .54)
Q17 . Law enforcement procedures are effective in
meeting the objectives of the fisheries mission at my unit.
Q18. Law enforcement procedures are effective in
meeting the objectives of the counter-narcotics mission at my
unit
.
Q19. Lav/ enforcement procedures are effective in
meeting the objectives of the AMIO mission at my unit.
Q20. Lav/ enforcement procedures are effective in
meeting the objectives of the RBS mission at my unit.
VII) LAW ENFORCEMENT GOALS (alpha = .44)
Q25. The Coast Guard's long term goal is to
increase its role in federal lav/ enforcement.
Q26. The Coast Guard's long term goal should be to
increase its role in federal law enforcement.
VIII) STRATEGIC PLANNING (alpha = .62)
Q28. Long term strategic planning for Coast Guard
law enforcement is effective.
Q29. In general, the Coast Guard lav/ enforcement
chain of command is more concerned with putting out everyday
"fires" than in long term strategic planning.
Q30. The Coast Guard law enforcement chain of
command does a good job of re-thinking strategy as the situation
demands it.
Q32 . The Coast Guard law enforcement community has
provided effective strategic intelligence information to my
unit
IX) POLITICAL INFLUENCE (alpha = n/a)
Q21. External influences such as presidential
directives, legislative actions, and foreign policy , that affect
the development of Coast Guard law enforcement policy, are
understood by personnel at my unit.
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E. MODEL TO BE INVESTIGATED
Given the available scaled variables and themes from our
interviews, combined with our qualitative review, a model to
analyze the survey data was developed incorporating the
constructs from the survey. Figure 5-1 is a graphical
representation of the model.
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Policy and Guidance Communication













Figure 5-1: Model for Strategic Planning and Law Enforcement
Organizational Effectiveness
The relationships between the independent, intermediate
process, and outcome variables is the primary focus of the
survey analysis . This model presents hypothesized
relationships between independent, process, and outcome
variables as derived from our interviews and the survey
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results. The first step in the analysis was to determine
whether the survey data support this model using Pearson
correlation coefficients to assess the degree of correlation
between the variables. After the viability of the model is
determined, we can then combine this information with
interview themes, descriptive statistics, and our qualitative
analysis, to determine how the Coast Guard law enforcement
community can improve its strategic planning and
implementation process. Relevant statistical differences for
a construct by law enforcement demographics and echelons in
the chain of command will also be presented.
F. RESULTS
Table 5-5 presents a correlation matrix for the variables
(constructs) for the model as outlined above. The upper
number in each cell is the correlation coefficient, while the
lower number in each cell represents the p value for
determining the level of significance in the correlation
between two constructs. All correlations are statistically
significant (p<.05), with the exception of construct seven's
interface with most of the other constructs. For this reason
construct seven will not be used for further analysis in this
model, while all other constructs will be. Actually it is not
surprising that this construct would not correlate with the
other constructs of the model. For one, it had the lowest
alpha score (.44) of any of the constructs. Secondly, and
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even more important, the two questions on goals that make up
the construct try to measure what "is" versus what "should
be"; they can "pull" in the opposite direction. These two
questions will be discussed more in detail later in this
chapter. These relatively high correlations between the
groupings of independent, process, and outcome variables give
strong support to the hypothesized model.
TABLE 5-5
CORRELATION MATRIX FOR MODEL VARIABLES



















































































I Adequacy, Distribution, and Measures of Effectiveness of
Resource Utilization (Intermediate Process Variable)
II Mission Priority Clarity/Fit (Outcome Variable)
III Policy and Guidance Communication (Independent Variable)
IV Policy and Guidance Feedback (Independent Variable)
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V Performance Standards Clarity (Outcome Variable)
VI Policy Effectiveness and Efficiency ( Outcome Variable)
VII Law Enforcement Goals (Intermediate Process Variable)
VIII Strategic Planning (Independent Variable)
IX Political Influence (Intermediate Process Variable)
G. INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS
Tables 5-6 through 5-8 that follow in this section provide
summary results of our statistical analysis, and include the
mean, and standard deviation for each of the constructs.
These tables will show a comparison of the construct results
by Coast Guard unit type, by position classification, and by
district. An analysis of variance (ANOVA) will then be run to
indicate whether the average answers to these constructs are
significantly different by these demographics. The numbers in
each cell represent the mean, and standard deviation to each
question, with the mean listed over the standard deviation.
The three place decimal number under the construct number in
the first column, represents the level of significance, or the
probability that the averages are statistically the same.
These Tables along with the most significant correlation
results from Table 5-5 will be used to facilitate discussion
and to build upon our qualitative analysis of Chapter IV.
1 . Independent Variables
We will first evaluate the most significant
relationships from the model presented in Figure 5-1 between
the independent variables and the affected intermediate
process and outcome variables.
a. Policy and Guidance Communication (construct III)
This construct is comprised of four theme questions
that ask Coast Guard law enforcement personnel to agree or
disagree on a five-point scale with aspects of communications
effectiveness. This independent variable, with an average
score of 3.24, is most strongly correlated with the
intermediate process variable of Political Influence (r=.37)
and the outcome variable of Mission Priority Clarity/Fit
(r=.53) . Tables 5-6 through 5-8 show a comparison of means
and standard deviations of construct III by unit type, by
position, and by district. Review of these tables show that
the average response by unit type is statistically different
at a probability of .995 (1-.005), is not statistically
different by position, and is statistically different at a
probability of .975 (1-.025) by district. Airstations,
district 11, and district 14 respondents, having average
scores of less than 3, tend to disagree that policy and
guidance communication is effective, while all other levels
tend to agree that it is effective. (The district 14 data is
not reliable due to the small sample size of 2 - a larger

























































































































































































I Adequacy, Distribution, and Measures of Effectiveness of
Resource Utilization (Intermediate Process Variable)
II Mission Priority Clarity/Fit (Outcome Variable)
III Policy and Guidance Communication (Independent Variable
IV Policy and Guidance Feedback (Independent Variable)
V Performance Standards Clarity (Outcome Variable)
VI Policy Effectiveness and Efficiency ( Outcome Variable
VII Law Enforcement Goals (Intermediate Process Variable)
VIII Strategic Planning (Independent Variable)
IX Political Influence (Intermediate Process Variable)
TABLE 5-7
















































































I Adequacy, Distribution, and Measures of Effectiveness of
Resource Utilization (Intermediate Process Variable)
II Mission Priority Clarity/Fit (Outcome Variable)
III Policy and Guidance Communication (Independent Variable
IV Policy and Guidance Feedback (Independent Variable)
V Performance Standards Clarity (Outcome Variable)
VI Policy Effectiveness and Efficiency ( Outcome Variable!
VII Law Enforcement Goals (Intermediate Process Variable)
VIII Strategic Planning (Independent Variable)














































































































































































































I Adequacy, Distribution, and Measures of Effectiveness of







Mission Priority Clarity/Fit (Outcome Variable)
Policy and Guidance Communication (Independent Variable
Policy and Guidance Feedback (Independent Variable)
Performance Standards Clarity (Outcome Variable)
Policy Effectiveness and Efficiency ( Outcome Variable!
Law Enforcement Goals (Intermediate Process Variable)
VIII Strategic Planning (Independent Variable)
IX Political Influence (Intermediate Process Variable)
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b. Policy and Guidance Feedback (construct IV)
This construct is comprised of three theme
questions that ask Coast Guard law enforcement personnel to
agree or disagree on a five-point scale with aspects of
feedback. This independent variable, with an average score of
3.37, is most strongly correlated with the intermediate
process variable of Political Influence (r=.31) and the
outcome variable of Mission Priority Clarity/Fit (r=.52)
.
Tables 5-6 through 5-8 show a comparison of means and standard
deviations of construct IV by unit type, by position, and by
district. Review of these tables show that the average
response by unit type is statistically different at a
probability of .998 (1-.002), is not statistically different
by position, and is statistically different at a probability
of .998 (1-.002) by district. Airstations, district 8, and
district 14 respondents, with average scores of less than 3,
tend to disagree that policy and guidance feedback is
effective, while all other levels tend to agree that it is
effective. (The district 14 data is not reliable due to the
small sample size of 2 - a larger sample size is necessary to
approach the Central Limit Theorem.
)
c. Strategic Planning (construct VIII)
This construct is comprised of four theme questions
that ask Coast Guard law enforcement personnel to agree or
disagree on a five-point scale with aspects of the Coast
Guard's strategic planning process with respect to law
enforcement. This independent variable, with an average score
of 2.80, is most strongly correlated with the intermediate
process variable of Adequacy, Distribution, and Measures of
Effectiveness of Resource Utilization (r=.47) and the outcome
variable of Mission Priority Clarity/Fit (r=.49) . Tables 5-6
through 5-8 show a comparison of means and standard deviations
of construct VIII by unit type, by position, and by district.
Review of these tables show that the average response by unit
type is statistically different at a probability of .998 (1-
.002), is not statistically different by position, and is
statistically different at a probability of .902 (1-.098) by
district. WMECs, district 17, and area respondents, with
average scores of greater than 3, tend to agree that strategic
planning is effective, while all other levels tend to disagree
that it is effective. (The area data is not reliable due to
the small sample size of 2 - a larger sample size is necessary
to approach the Central Limit Theorem.
)
2 . Intermediate Process Variables
The next step in our model evaluation is to look at
which independent variables have the most significant
correlation to the intermediate process variables, and what
outcome variables are most highly correlated to the
intermediate process variables.
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a. Adequacy, Distribution and Measures of
Effectiveness of Resource Utilization
(construct I)
This construct is comprised of three theme
questions that ask Coast Guard law enforcement personnel to
agree or disagree on a five-point scale with aspects of
resource management. This intermediate process variable, with
an average score of 2.85, is most strongly correlated with the
independent variable of Strategic Planning (r=.47) and the
outcome variable of Mission Priority Clarity/Fit (r=.43)
.
Tables 5-6 through 5-8 show a comparison of means and standard
deviations of construct I by unit type, by position, and by
district . Review of these tables show that the average
response by unit type is statistically different at a
probability of .909 (1-.091), is not statistically different
by position, and is statistically different at a probability
of .956 (1-.044) by district. Of note here is the fact that
WMECs, district 9, and district 17 respondents, with average
scores greater than 3, tend to agree that resources are
adequate, fairly distributed, and have adequate measures of
effectiveness in their utilization, while all other levels
tend to disagree.
b. Law Enforcement Goals (construct VII)
This construct is comprised of two questions
that ask Coast Guard law enforcement personnel to agree or
disagree on a five-point scale with whether the Coast Guard's
goal "is", or "should be", to increase its role in federal law
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enforcement. From Figure 5-1 and as noted above, this
construct does not correlate well with the other constructs of
our survey. For this reason its correlations are not included
for further discussion. The original intent of these two
questions was for consensus mapping purposes, which will be
discussed in our conclusions and recommendations chapter.
Tables 5-6 through 5-8 show a comparison of means and standard
deviations of construct VII by unit type, position, and
district . Review of these tables show that the average
response is not statistically different by unit type, is not
statistically different by position, and is not statistically
different by district.
c. Political Influence (construct IX)
This construct is comprised of one theme
question that asks Coast Guard law enforcement personnel to
agree or disagree on a five-point scale with how well
political influences on Coast Guard law enforcement policy are
understood at the unit level. This intermediate process
variable, with an average score of 2.74, is most strongly
correlated with the independent variable of Strategic Planning
(r=.39) and the outcome variable of Mission Priority
Clarity/Fit (r=.41) . Tables 5-6 through 5-8 show a comparison
of means and standard deviations of construct IX by unit type,
by position, and by district. Review of these tables show
that the average response is not statistically different
(significance level = .373) by unit type, is not statistically
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different (significance level =.797) by position, and is not
statistically different (significance level = .123) by
district. As would be expected on this question, and with
only a few exceptions, most levels on this question indicate
that external political influences that affect the development
of Coast Guard law enforcement, are not understood at the unit
level
.
3 . Outcome Variables
Our last step is to evaluate those independent and
intermediate process variables that correlate most
significantly to the outcome variables.
a. Performance Standards Clarity (construct V)
This construct is comprised of four theme questions
that ask Coast Guard law enforcement personnel to agree or
disagree on a five-point scale with aspects of performing four
of the Coast Guard's prime law enforcement missions. This
outcome variable, with an average score of 3.40, is most
strongly correlated with the intermediate process variable of
Adequacy, Distribution and Measures of Effectiveness of
Resource Utilization (r=.35) and the independent variable of
Policy and Guidance Communication (r=.47) . Tables 5-6 through
5-8 show a comparison of means and standard deviations of
construct V by unit type, by position, and by district.
Review of these tables show that the average response by unit
type is statistically different at a probability of .998 (1-
.002), is not statistically different by position, and is
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statistically different at a probability of .978 (1-.022) by
district. Of note here is the fact that, even though there is
statistical difference to these constructs by unit type and
district, all levels show a tendency to agree that law
enforcement performance standards are clear with the exception
of airstations. Their average score was 2.73.
b. Policy Effectiveness and Efficiency (construct VI)
This construct is comprised of four theme questions
that ask Coast Guard law enforcement personnel to agree or
disagree on a five-point scale with whether current procedures
are effective in meeting law enforcement objectives. This
outcome variable, with an average score of 3.32, is most
strongly correlated with the intermediate process variable of
Political Influence (r=.37) and the independent variable of
Policy and Guidance Communication (r=.42) . Tables 5-6 through
5-8 show a comparison of means and standard deviations of
construct VI by unit type, by position, and by district.
Review of these tables show that the average response by unit
type is statistically different at a probability of .994 (1-
.006), is not statistically different by position, and is
statistically different at a probability of .982 (1-.018) by
district. Airstations, district 8, and district 14
respondents, with average scores of less than 3, tend to
disagree that Coast Guard law enforcement policies are
effective and efficient, while all other levels tend to agree
that these policies are effective and efficient. (The
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district 14 data is not reliable due to the small sample size
of 2 - a larger sample size is necessary to approach the
Central Limit Theorem.
)
c. Mission Priority Clarity/Fit (construct II)
This construct is comprised of seven theme
questions that ask Coast Guard law enforcement personnel to
agree or disagree on a five-point scale with aspects of
mission priority clarity and how well law enforcement missions
fit with other unit missions. This outcome variable, with an
average score of 3.41, is most strongly correlated with the
intermediate process variable of Adequacy, Distribution and
Measures of Effectiveness of Resource Utilization (r=.43) and
the independent variable of Policy and Guidance Communication
(r=.53) . Tables 5-6 through 5-8 show a comparison of means
and standard deviations of construct II by unit type, by
position, and by district. Review of these tables show that
the average response by unit type is statistically different
at a probability of 1.0 (1-.000), is not statistically
different by position, and is statistically different at a
probability of .997 (1-.003) by district. Airstation
respondents, with an average score of less than 3, tend to
disagree that Coast Guard law enforcement priorities are clear
and fit well with other missions, while all other levels tend
to agree that law enforcement priorities are clear and fit
well with other missions at the unit level.
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H. OVERALL SURVEY RESULTS BY QUESTION
Appendix B presents the overall survey results by
question, with the questions listed by means in ascending
order; this data will be referenced in our conclusions and
recommendations chapter.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. FINDINGS BY MODEL
The analysis of our hypothesized model from Figure 5-1
with the constructs that we developed, provide some useful
insight for developing a strategic planning and implementation
model
.
What these results indicate is that the effectiveness of
policy and guidance communication and policy and guidance
feedback will have a definite impact on the degree to which
political influences are understood at the operating level,
and more importantly, how clear mission priorities will be for
operational commanders - the relationships are direct. The
results also indicate that the more effective strategic
planning is, the more effective resource management will be,
and again the clearer mission priorities will be for the unit
commanders. Finally, the results indicate that for law
enforcement performance standards to be clear, resource
management and policy and guidance communications must be
effective; also that effective and efficient policy is
dependent most heavily on effective policy and guidance
communication
.
The overall purpose for developing relationships in this
model is for use in continuous process improvement in the
strategic planning and implementation process for Coast Guard
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law enforcement. Perhaps these relationships come as no
surprise to an experienced manager, but they do emphasize the
relationship between these variables so as to provide insight
for strategic planning and management decision purposes.
B. FINDINGS BY DEMOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS
1. By Unit Type
Other interesting insights were developed from our
quantitative analysis of Chapter V. We see that when we
analyzed our construct variables by type of unit, there were
statistically different answers to all constructs with the
exception of the intermediate process variables of political
influence and goals. Since there were statistical differences
in all three independent variables, which have a direct effect
on the desired outcome variables, care should be exercised to
improve these independent variables across all unit types, so
as to achieve a more uniform strategic planning and
implementation process throughout the Coast Guard law
enforcement community. Based on our qualitative analysis, we
attribute these statistical differences to the fact that
different unit types receive different emphasis on their input
variables, which has a direct affect on their output
performance variables. For example, larger cutters expressed
higher satisfaction with communications, feedback and the
strategic planning process, and therefore also expressed
higher satisfaction with performance standards clarity, policy
97
effectiveness and efficiency, and mission priority clarity and
fit.
2. By Position
When we analyzed our construct variables by position,
there were no statistical differences in answers based on
position held at unit. This lends some integrity to our other
statistically different data in that the cover letter to the
survey, which was signed by Coast Guard Headquarters, stated
that the answers to the survey "should reflect the
understanding your command or organizational level has with
respect to law enforcement issues." We believe the
respondents followed this advice, and passed these surveys to
the "individual" who could respond best to these broad law
enforcement issues. Our sample respondents represented a
broad spectrum from senior petty officers to commanding
officers, with no statistical differences based on position
held. When looking at ways to improve strategic planning and
implementation, this indicates relative position in an
organization is not a critical factor to consider.
3 . By District
When we analyzed our construct variables by district,
there again were statistically different answers to all
constructs with the exception of the intermediate process
variables of political influence and goals. Since there were
statistical differences in all three independent variables,
which have a direct effect on the desired outcome variables,
98
care should be exercised to improve these independent
variables across all districts, so as to achieve a more
uniform strategic planning and implementation process
throughout the Coast Guard law enforcement community. We
attribute these statistical differences to variable law
enforcement emphasis from region to region, based on regional
significance to a particular law enforcement mission.
C. FINDINGS BY CONSTRUCT
1. General Findings
Table 5-3 showed the overall results to this survey by
construct and indicated that the constructs of political
influence, strategic planning and resource management all
scored below the average score of three Coast Guard wide, with
all other constructs scoring above three. Strategic planning
is the one independent variable of these three. We have noted
previously its relationship to political influence being
understood at the operating level and on effective resource
management. We therefore recommend management priority be to
improve the strategic planning process. Effective resource
management and political influence being understood should
follow an improvement to the strategic planning and
implementation process.
2. Cutters Versus Shore Units
Referring to Table 5-6 we find that the survey
responses for the cutters (WHECs, WMECs & WPBs) are higher
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than the shore based operational units (Groups, Stations & Air
Stations) for constructs II and III. Construct II pertained
to mission priority clarity while construct III had to do with
policy guidance and communication. This quantitative data
reinforces what we learned from interviews of Coast Guard
personnel assigned to ships versus shore units. These
interviews revealed that larger cutters received more explicit
guidance by means of pre-patrol briefings, operational orders
and real-time message traffic updates. This led to greater
satisfaction by these units with regards to their outcome
performance variables.
Most personnel assigned to cutters that we spoke with
felt they received good guidance from their operational
commander about what was important for them to achieve on a
particular patrol. We recall one WMEC commanding officer
saying he received almost hourly mission guidance updates via
message traffic while on patrol. Cutters often receive pre-
patrol briefings and follow guidelines from a patrol
operations order (OPORDER)
.
Meanwhile the operational shore units did not speak of
receiving the same type of guidance. Personnel at this type
of unit often spoke of not being clear of what was most
important or not knowing what was expected of their unit.




We recommend that (G-OLE) focus on the communication
of law enforcement objectives and priorities to shore units
along the same lines as they do with cutters. Floyd pointed
out in our Chapter III literature review that top management
needs to provide strategic context for middle managers and get
them involved in strategic decisions.
D. FINDINGS BY QUESTION
1. Measures of Effectiveness
In our Chapter IV qualitative review we spoke of (G-
OLE-1) wanting to improve its ability to measure the
effectiveness of Coast Guard units carrying out the law
enforcement mission. Coast Guard personnel gave their
opinions about what they felt was often inefficient use of
resources. Appendix B showed the overall results to this
survey by question. With this in mind, it is not really
surprising that the survey question with the lowest mean
response score was question number 22, which read: "The Coast
Guard has valid measures of effectiveness for its lav;
enforcement missions which are helpful at my unit." Not only
was this the lowest scoring question on this survey, but it
was also the only significant jump in the continuum of average
responses to all questions. Seven other questions scored
below the average of three, but these are better analyzed by




We then draw the conclusion that (G-OLE) needs to
receive a clearer assessment of what is actually taking place
in the field during mission execution. It appears that there
is a communications breakdown between the field units and
Headquarters regarding this kind of data. The words of
guidance from our Chapter III literature review would seem to
provide a good conceptual framework to improve the
communications needed for better measures of effectiveness:
for strategy, the tendency is to think exclusively in terms of
top management, but this presumes they fully comprehend the
situation and know what needs to be done. In complex or
changing environments, individuals rarely appreciate all the
intricacies of this situation, and organizations benefit from
the variety of viewpoints represented by middle and operating
level managers. Unless they understand the strategic context,
however, lower-level managers are unable to recognize
significant events, offer sound advice, or propose good
options
.
It is very difficult to apply quantitative measures of
effectiveness for many of the law enforcement missions
performed by the Coast Guard, as well as other law enforcement
agencies. What aggravates many field personnel is what they
perceive as non-meaningful measures of effectiveness being
applied to their law enforcement performance goals; to
improve measures of effectiveness used in the law enforcement
community will first require the commitment from (G-OLE) to
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retrieve and evaluate a qualitative assessment by field units
of how well policy is translated into mission execution.
Providing feedback to the field units will enlighten their
strategic context and hopefully spur on a continually
improving communications loop.
2. Fisheries Mission
The following data is taken from Appendix B:
Lav; Enforcement Objectives Performance Standards
Fisheries Q13 - 3.17 Q9 - 3.08
AMIO Q15 - 3.41 Qll - 3.22
Drugs Q14 - 3.58 Q10 - 3.56
RBS Q16 - 3 .70 Q12 - 3 .75
One can see from this data that the fisheries mission
scored the lowest for the two sets of survey questions
pertaining to law enforcement objectives and performance
standards. This would seem to indicate that the fisheries
mission may be most unclear of the law enforcement missions.
During some of our interviews Coast Guard personnel
spoke of the difficulty they had in staying abreast of the
various fishing regulations. In particular small shore units
felt that the complexity and volume of fishing regulations was
a full time job in itself. Many smaller units developed
liaisons with state and federal fisheries agencies to stay on
top of the current enforcement strategy. We recommend a
consolidated, streamlined training program be instituted using
videotapes or tele-conferences as the primary communications
medium.
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3 . Strategic Planning
One other significant recommendation here deals with
question number twenty-nine. Although this question scored
relatively high Coast Guard wide with an average of 3.55,
what this tells us is that there is a general tendency to
agree that the Coast Guard law enforcement chain of command is
more concerned with putting out everyday "fires" than in long
term strategic planning. We believe this result speaks for
itself and points to the need for an improved strategic
planning process that is proactive in nature.
E. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
All of our findings seem to demonstrate a lack of
strategic understanding on the part of many field units. We
wish to stress that we observed high levels of commitment to
all the law enforcement missions by Coast Guard personnel
during our field interviews . We are encouraged by the genuine
desire we found in (G-OLE) to improve communications of
strategic context to the field. From our Chapter III
literature review, we found that Coast Guard law enforcement
personnel were highly committed, yet lacked strategic
understanding. Based on Floyd and Wooldridge's research, we
deduce that these personnel generally fall into the "blind
devotion" category. If the Coast Guard can improve its
strategic understanding processes, these personnel would shift
into the "strong consensus" category. It is important for
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Coast Guard leaders and managers to realize that problems with
consensus are causes of poor strategy implementation. The
following are ways to improve strategic consensus:
- Stimulate continuous participation in the planning
process from all those who are capable of contributing.
- Translate strategic analysis into meaningful terms among
peers
.
- Commit to achieve strategic objectives by translating
aspirational goals into objectives which enable
measurement
.
- Highlight the importance of strategic thinking in the
organization by rewarding strategic thinking and removing
fear of penalization.
Furthermore, in Figures 3-5, 3-6 and 3-7, Reid gives
specific guidance on operationalizing the strategic planning
process
.
We also recommend that personnel attending upcoming law
enforcement conferences brainstorm ideas about how to
stimulate continuous participation in the planning process.
Research shows that high levels of shared understanding are
built from direct exposure to strategic priorities. Ideas
could be developed
. to promote this kind of exposure for the
operational units. Future research could be done to develop
more definitive means of achieving appropriate permeation of
strategic planning into operational units.
F. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Survey response was excellent on the part of all Coast
Guard personnel receiving this survey. It provided a diverse
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data base by district, by unit type, and by position. This
obviously shows a great deal of concern and professionalism by
the Coast Guard law enforcement community. Twenty four
surveys were received after the date we used to cut off our
data base (N=170) . This would have provided a response rate
of over 70%. Due to the profound interest by Coast Guard
Headquarters and by all law enforcement field personnel, we
recommend further and more definitive research into the
following areas:
1) Development of qualitative measures of effectiveness for
Coast Guard law enforcement
.
2) Development of specific tools and ways to improve law
enforcement strategic communication.
3) Examining other law enforcement agencies to determine
the applicability of their strategic planning processes
to the Coast Guard law enforcement community.
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APPENDIX A
COAST GUARD LAW ENFORCEMENT SURVEY
Please circle the appropriate demographic category listed below:
Type Of unit: WHEC WMEC WPB GROUP SARSTA AIRSTA DISTRICT
District in which unit is located/homeported_
Position: CO XO OINC XPO OPS LEPO OTHER
Years of service
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The following statements are about Coast Guard law enforcement and
the experiences you have had in your current assignment. Please use
the following scale to show how much you agree or disagree with each




1. The communication of Coast Guard law 12 3 4 5
enforcement policy to my unit is timely.
2. The communication of Coast Guard law 12 3 4 5
enforcement policy to my unit is clear.
3. My Coast Guard unit is able to give and 12 3 4 5
receive feedback on lav; enforcement missions
in a timely manner.
4. My Coast Guard unit is able to give and 12 3 4 5
receive feedback on law enforcement missions
in a clear manner.
5. One of the Coast Guard's major concerns is 12 3 4 5
losing law enforcement mission and budget
dollars
.
6. My Coast Guard unit has enough resources to 12 3 4 5
carry out its law enforcement missions effectively.
7. Resources are proportionately distributed to 12 3 4 5
Coast Guard operational units based on the
magnitude of their missions.
8. Law enforcement policy guidance is 12 3 4 5
consistent, and is conveyed uniformly
down the chain of command.
9
.
Law enforcement procedures for my Coast 12 3 4 5
Guard unit's fisheries mission are clear.
10. Lav/ enforcement procedures for my Coast 12 3 4 5
Guard unit's counter-narcotics mission are clear.
11. Law enforcement procedures for my Coast 12 3 4 5
Guard unit's AMIO mission are clear.
12. Lav; enforcement procedures for my Coast 12 3 4 5
Guard unit's RBS mission are clear.
13. Law enforcement objectives for the Coast 12 3 4 5
Guard fisheries mission are clear for my unit.
14. Law enforcement objectives for the Coast 12 3 4 5
Guard counter-narcotics mission are clear for
my unit
15. Law enforcement objectives for the Coast 12 3 4 5
Guard AMIO mission are clear for my unit.
16. Law enforcement objectives for the Coast 12 3 4 5
Guard RBS mission are clear for my unit.
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17. Law enforcement procedures are effective 12 3 4 5
in meeting the objectives of the fisheries
mission at my unit.
18. Law enforcement procedures are effective 12 3 4 5
in meeting the objectives of the counter-
narcotics mission at my unit.
19. Law enforcement procedures are effective 12 3 4 5
in meeting the objectives of the AMIO mission
at my unit.
20. Lav; enforcement procedures are effective 12 3 4 5
in meeting the objectives of the RBS mission
at my unit.
21. External influences such as presidential 12 3 4 5
directives, legislative actions, and foreign
policy, that affect the development of Coast
Guard law enforcement policy, are understood
by the personnel at my unit
.
22. The Coast Guard has valid measures of 12 3 4 5
effectiveness for its law enforcement missions
which are helpful at my unit.
23. Law enforcement missions fit well with 12 3 4 5
the other missions at my Coast Guard unit.
24. Coast Guard law enforcement objectives are 12 3 4 5
developed and communicated to my unit in a
timely manner.
25. The Coast Guard's long term goal is to 12 3 4 5
increase its role in federal law enforcement.
26. The Coast Guard's long term goal should 12 3 4 5
be to increase its role in federal law
enforcement
.
27. Coast Guard law enforcement mission 12 3 4 5
objectives can be easily translated into
unit action plans.
28. Long term strategic planning for Coast 12 3 4 5
Guard lav; enforcement is effective.
29. In general, the Coast Guard law 12 3 4 5
enforcement chain of command is more concerned
with putting out everyday "fires" than in long
term strategic planning.
30. The Coast Guard law enforcement chain 12 3 4 5
of command does a good job of re-thinking
strategy as the situation demands it.
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31. Coast Guard law enforcement program 12 3 4 5
managers provide my unit guidance at the right
time to effectively and efficiently carry out
ELT mission responsibilities.
32. The Coast Guard law enforcement community 12 3 4 5
has provided effective strategic intelligence
information to my unit.
33. My unit has been provided tactical 12 3 4 5
intelligence "products" that are useful.
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APPENDIX B
QUESTION BY TOTAL SURVEY RESPONDENTS
MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS
ASCENDING MEAN ORDERED
QUESTION MEAN STD DEV N
Q22 2.31 1.03 170
Q32 2.71 1.12 170
Q21 2.74 1.07 170
Q2 8 2 .78 0.90 170
Q7 2.82 1.07 170
Q33 2.88 1.07 170
Q30 2 .92 0.96 170
Q8 2 .99 1.09 170
Q31 3.01 0.95 170
Q5 3 .07 1.14 170
Q9 3.08 1.19 170
Q17 3.09 1.07 170
Q2 5 3.15 0.80 170
Q13 3 .17 1.16 170
Q24 3 .22 0.95 170
QH 3.22 1.05 170
Q19 3.22 0.96 170
Q18 3.22 1.00 170
Q27 3.27 0.96 170
Q2 3.39 0.98 170
Q26 3.40 1.03 170
Q6 3.41 1.18 170
Q15 3.41 1.04 170
Q3 3.43 1.01 170
Ql 3.46 1.00 170
Q29 3.55 1.04 170
Q10 3.56 0.88 170
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APPENDIX B (continued)
QUESTION BY TOTAL SURVEY RESPONDENTS
MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS
ASCENDING MEAN ORDERED
QUESTION MEAN STD DEV N
Q14 3.58 0.98 170
Q4 3.67 0.84 170
Q16 3.70 0.92 170
Q2 3.73 0.87 170
Q12 3.75 0.91 170
Q2 3 3 78 1.02 170
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